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Consumer over-indebtedness affects anyone in the world whether rich or poor. However, it is 
a common feature amongst the poor or rather the low income earners, since they will from 
time to time find other means to subsidise the little that they have. They achieve this through 
borrowing money from loan sharks who instead of assisting them from their over-
indebtedness worsen their position through interests from these loans. As any other consumer 
debtor they deserve protection not just protection but equal and appropriate protection in 
order to obtain debt relief. In South Africa there are three debt relief mechanisms at the 
disposal of debtors these are found under the Insolvency Act of 1936, the Magistrates’ Court 
Act of 1944 and the National Credit Act of 2005. This dissertation seeks to examine the 
South African consumer insolvency and debt relief legislative provisions. This will be done 
in order to ascertain whether these legislative provisions appropriately provide debt relief to 
LILA debtors. Failure to find adequate provisions for the relief of LILA debtors in South 
Africa this study will endeavour to ascertain if whether there may be appropriate debt relief 
mechanisms in foreign jurisdictions which have the potential of granting a LILA debtor debt 
relief. This comparative study will be done on countries such as the United States of 
America, England and Wales to name but a few. This comparative study is of importance 
since it will give lessons to South Africa on how to address the position of LILA debtors in 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
‘…the borrower is servant to the lender’ 
        The book of Proverbs1 
1.1 Background  
In South Africa, as in other jurisdictions across the globe,2 consumer over-indebtedness is a 
major concern. For a large proportion of the South African population, over-indebtedness 
keeps them in a type of ‘debt servitude’ in that they spend their lives working to earn money 
to pay their debts, with minimal, if any, disposable income to apply towards subsistence 
needs, let alone to improve their standard of living. For these debtors, who are mainly de 
facto insolvent, the South African law falls short of what is required to address appropriately 
the problems arising out of and constituted by consumer over-indebtedness and insolvency. 
This is in spite of the existence of: the Insolvency Act,3 which regulates the sequestration of 
the estates of individual debtors; section 74 the Magistrates’ Courts Act4 (MCA), which 
provides for the administration of debt the total amount of which does not exceed R50 000; 
and the National Credit Act5 (NCA), which provides for debt review and restructuring by the 
magistrate’s court of debts arising out of credit agreements.  
The debt relief mechanisms in South Africa offer little or nothing to debtors who have low 
income and minimal assets. Such debtors may be referred to as ‘low asset low income’ 
(LILA) debtors. They have little to offer towards meeting a judgment debt and or monetary 
obligations. As such, LILA debtors may be regarded as falling under the same category as so-
called ‘no income no asset’ (NINA) debtors, who similarly cannot pay anything towards 
fulfilling their debt obligations.6 The effect of the Insolvency Act’s strict requirement that 
sequestration should be to the ‘advantage of creditors’ precludes certain types of debtors, and, 
                                                          
1King James Version Chapter 22 verse 7 (Jewish and Christian Bible). 
2Examples of such jurisdictions are United States of America, England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. 
3Act 24 of 1936. 
4Act 32 of 1944. 
5Act 34 of 2005. 
6For discussion of the position and treatment of treatment NINA debtors in South Africa, see H Coetzee and M 
Roestoff ‘Consumer debt relief in South Africa – Should the Insolvency System provide for NINA debtors? 
Lessons from New Zealand’ 22 Int. Insolv. Rev (2013) 188. See also discussion of NINA debtors, Working 
Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons Report on the treatment of the insolvency of 
natural persons (Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, World Bank) par 297 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/WBInsolvencyOfNaturalPersonsReport_01_11_13.pdf 
accessed on 28 December 2014 –  hereafter the World Bank Report. 
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typically, LILA debtors, from having their estates sequestrated. This is because it is required 
to be proved that some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors if the estate is sequestrated. 
This in turn means that LILA debtors would never have the opportunity of having their pre-
sequestration debt discharged upon rehabilitation in terms of the Insolvency Act. 
Rehabilitation is a process which takes place after sequestration of a debtor’s estate which has 
the effect of discharging all pre-sequestration debts and relieving the debtor of every 
disability resulting from sequestration.7 This aspect of South African insolvency law serves in 
part to provide insolvent debtors with a ‘fresh start’, as it is known in American parlance, by 
granting them debt discharge after they have partially met their financial obligations. A fresh 
start ‘…is about the debtor beginning again on the economic treadmill; having a restored 
ability to participate in the open credit economy; restoring their “financial well-being”, or 
obtaining longer term financial health’.8 Both the administration system, in terms of section 
74 of the MCA, and the NCA’s debt review and debt re-arrangement provisions provide debt 
relief to a certain type of debtor as has been pointed out above. These procedures require all 
debts to be paid in full. They do not contain any provision for debt discharge and thus do not 
provide debtors with a ‘fresh start’ in the sense that rehabilitation does.  
At present, South African insolvency law does not provide for appropriate informal out of 
court debt settlement or rearrangement. The current debt relief measures are characterised by 
formal court proceedings. In order for a debtor to be declared insolvent and have his or her 
estate sequestrated he or she has to lodge an application in the High Court.9 A debtor has to 
lodge an application in the magistrate’s court for an administration order.10 A debt counsellor, 
who will also charge a fee, has to make a recommendation to the magistrate’s court in order 
for a debtor to have his or her debt re-arranged in terms of NCA.11 This, in effect, bars most 
LILA debtors from obtaining debt relief as they do not have money to afford legal 
representation and to meet the court costs and other fees.  As a result, most over-indebted 
LILA debtors seek other, unfavourable options to pay off their debts, such as borrowing from 
loan sharks. Loan sharks take advantage of the unfortunate situation of LILA debtors and 
impose unreasonably high interest rates. This, together with all the other debts due, make the 
life of a LILA debtor miserable. Thus the effect of the restrictions in each of the range of 
                                                          
7S 129(1) of the Insolvency Act. 
8N Howell ‘The fresh start goal of the Bankruptcy Act: Giving a temporary reprieve or facilitating debtor 
rehabilitation’ 14 QUT Law Review (2014) 29, 32. See also discussion in the World Bank Report (note 6 above) 
par 359. 
9S 3 of the Insolvency Act. 
10S 74(1) (b) of the MCA. 
11S 86(7) (c) of the NCA. 
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applicable provisions, viewed as a whole, is that LILA debtors, who often need debt relief the 
most, cannot access it. 
A question is therefore posed whether LILA debtors should be afforded the same treatment as 
other debtors who obtain debt relief under the mechanisms that are currently available? In 
terms of the Constitution,12 South Africa is a democratic state. One of the founding values of 
the Constitution is the achievement of equality13 and it would seem that the legislature has 
not adequately provided ‘equal debt relief’ for LILA debtors. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This paper will examine the South African consumer insolvency and debt relief legislative 
provisions. It seeks to identify the lacunae in the South African legal system which fails to 
provide debt relief to LILA debtors.  Further, it will endeavor to ascertain whether there are 
appropriate measures which may be introduced or adopted from other foreign jurisdictions to 
cater for LILA debtors. A comparative study of the position in the United States of America 
(USA), England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland and New Zealand, specifically focusing on 
legislative provisions offering more debtor friendly relief mechanisms to a LILA debtor, and 
a measure of debt discharge, will be undertaken. This comparative study is important since it 
will show how these jurisdictions have enhanced their debt relief legislative measures, which 
are able appropriately to accommodate most types of debtors, including LILA debtors. For 
example, according to Evans,14 the American bankruptcy system is different from a number 
of debt relief regimes. Unlike the South African regime, which hinges on the requirement that 
sequestration should be to the ‘advantage of creditors’,15 American policy is based on 
providing a debtor with a ‘fresh start’.16 Studying insolvency and consumer debt related 
legislation applicable in foreign jurisdictions, including reforms brought about there, and, 
more specifically, provisions applicable in respect of debtors who have low income and 
possess few material assets, may provide valuable pointers and guidance regarding possible 
appropriate statutory reform in South Africa. 
                                                          
12Act 108 of 1996. 
13Ibid Chapter 1(a). 
14R G Evans ‘A brief explanation of consumer bankruptcy and aspects of the bankruptcy estate in the United 
States of America’ The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa (2010) 337, 337. 
15See also s 6, 10 and 12 of the Insolvency Act. A Boraine and C van Heerden ‘To sequestrate or not to 
sequestrate in view of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: A tale of two judgments’ Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal (2010) 84, 88. 




1.3 Rationale of the study 
Over-indebtedness can cause a great deal of pain and hopelessness to those who are unable to 
pay their bills each month. A vast number of over-indebted debtors spend their lives earning 
money just to pay off their debts.17 Families and individuals have suffered due to the 
instabilities associated with over-indebtedness.18 For many, debt is like a social ill that never 
heals: it is a never ending cycle. It is often an insurmountable hurdle for over-indebted 
debtors to obtain a discharge.19 There is, therefore, a need for the legislature to address this 
area of law. 
This study, therefore, will be of importance to the economy and over-indebted debtors, of 
which there are many in South Africa. A recent newspaper article pointed out that ‘the credit 
market is volatile, most over-indebted low income workers turn to micro-lenders, who offer 
unsecured loans at hefty interest’.20 These micro-lenders in turn make excessive use of 
garnishee orders to secure repayment of debts where credit was granted recklessly. 
Staggering numbers of South Africans are going home at the end of the month with severely 
diminished salaries because of garnishee orders.21 This is shown in a report by the University 
of Pretoria's Law Clinic which revealed that ‘more than 500,000 South Africans have their 
salaries docked every month’.22 This, therefore, calls for the legislature to come to the rescue 
of LILA debtors. Further, much of the labour strife is a result of the economic meltdown due 
to debts not discharged, as shown by the incident at Marikana (where miners went on strike 
and there was massive shooting by the police), a town with minimal infrastructure but eleven 
micro-lenders.23 Debt trap situations in a country’s economy, with debtors unable to repay 
their debts, can contribute to a large extent to an economic meltdown.24 This may be 
attributed to the absence of effective debt relief measures providing for debtors such as LILA 
                                                          
17T A Lefifi ‘Study shows defaulters cost economy R9, 7bn’ available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2013/11/24/study-shows-defaulters-cost-economy-r9.7bn accessed 26 
November 2013. 
18D Hall ‘New restructuring targets for banks don’t go far enough to debt distressed borrowers’ available at 
http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-new-restructuring-targets-for-banks-dont-go-far-enough-to-help-
distressed-borrowers-830976-Mar2013/ accessed 18 November 2013. 
19Lefifi (note 17 above). 
20C Benjamin ‘Business garnishee abuse order of the day’ available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-25-00-
garnishee-abuse-is-order-of-the-day accessed 4 November 2013. 
21S Mouton ‘Easy credit a cause of labour strife’ available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2013/10/11/easy-credit-a-cause-of-labour-strife accessed 26 October 2013. 
22Lefifi (note 17 above). 
23Benjamin (note 20 above). 
24World Development Movement ‘Third world debt’ available at http://www.wdm.org.uk/category/issues/third-
world-debt accessed 18 November 2013. 
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debtors. Measures will be recommended that benefit LILA debtors so that they will not be 
left in a situation where they are trapped by debt. 
It is therefore imperative for the legislature to address this area of law as every consumer 
must at least be protected as envisaged by section 3(g) of the NCA. The section points out 
that one of the means to achieve the purpose of the Act is ‘…to provide mechanisms for 
resolving over-indebtedness’.25 This has not been achieved thus far. Protection for certain 
categories of debtors such as the LILA has not been achieved by the NCA nor other debt 
relief legislation in South Africa. As such, presently, in South Africa there are no 
mechanisms for providing debt relief to most LILA debtors. A call may therefore be made for 
this area of law to be addressed. 
1.4 Focus of research 
This study will focus on the position of LILA debtors within the context of the current debt 
relief mechanisms in South Africa. It will look at how select foreign jurisdictions have passed 
legislation to ameliorate the position of LILA debtors, in order to provide them with a 
measure of debt relief. Comparisons will then be made with a view to identifying potential 
appropriate reform for South African law.  
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
South African insolvency law favours the interests of creditors. This is evidenced by the 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement that must be met by debtors for their estates to be 
sequestrated and, ultimately, for them to be rehabilitated, with the accompanying discharge in 
respect of liability for pre-sequestration debt, as discussed above.  The ‘advantage to 
creditors’ requirement is an insurmountable hurdle to a poor debtor who is then left only with 
the option of seeking debt relief under the NCA or MCA. However, debt review and re-
arrangement and the administration order each target a particular group of debtors. Hence a 
debtor may find themselves in a situation whereby they have no debt relief mechanism at 
their disposal. The underlying assumption in this study is that a more favourable approach to 
debtors, or, more accurately, one which balances the interests of debtors and creditors, should 
be embraced. 
                                                          
25S 3 (g) of the NCA. 
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1.6 Research questions and overviews of chapters 
In order to achieve the purpose stated above, this paper will endeavor to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the current debt relief measures in South Africa? 
2. Do the current debt relief measures in South Africa appropriately provide debt relief to 
LILA debtors?  
3. What gaps currently exist in South Africa debt relief measures as far as LILA debtors 
are concerned? 
4. Which statutory provisions, with regard to LILA debtors, may be identified from other 
foreign jurisdictions as appropriate for adoption in South Africa? 
5. What changes may be made in order to provide appropriate debt relief to LILA debtors 
in South Africa?  
This, first chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation. Debt relief measures in South 
Africa will be dealt with in the second chapter, which will discuss the common law 
compromise, voluntary surrender, compulsory sequestration, administration orders,  and, 
finally, debt review and debt re-arrangement. Chapter Two will also briefly discuss past law 
reform initiatives, including proposed amendments contained in the Insolvency Bill.26 
Chapter Three will compare debt relief measures in other jurisdictions, namely the USA, 
England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland and New Zealand. The debt relief mechanisms 
providing relief to LILA debtors in these foreign jurisdictions will be the area of focus. The 
final chapter will provide a conclusion and recommendations. 
1.7 Research objectives and methodology 
The study aims to critically analyse the current debt relief mechanisms in South Africa and to 
show that they do not adequately provide debt relief to LILA debtors.   
                                                          
26Insolvency Bill 2000. 
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It will demonstrate that some of the applicable debt relief mechanisms, such as the 
administration order27 and debt review and debt re-arrangement,28 by not allowing debt 
discharge, deprive a debtor from obtaining a ‘fresh start’.  
The study will evaluate debt relief mechanisms in selected foreign jurisdictions which do 
grant a measure of debt relief to a LILA debtor. Ultimately, appropriate changes to the 
current debt relief measures will be proposed to ensure that a LILA debtor in South Africa 
has a measure of debt relief at his or her disposal. 
 The study is based solely on available legislation, reported judgments and published 
literature. Reference to South African legislation and regulations will inform an outline of the 
position in South Africa insolvency law, regarding the requirement for and circumstances in 
which a debtor may obtain discharge from liability to his or her creditors. A comparative 
study of the position in other jurisdictions, such as the USA, England and Wales, Scotland, 
Ireland and New Zealand will be undertaken. Reference will be made to legislative provisions 
applicable in these jurisdictions as well as the available literature.  









                                                          
27A Boraine ‘The reform of administration orders within a new consumer credit framework’ in M Kelly-Louw et 
al The future of consumer credit regulation creative approach to emerging challenges Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
(2008) 187,190,194 and 196. 
28C van Heerden and A Boraine ‘The interaction between the debt relief measures in the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005 and aspects of insolvency law’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (2009) 22, 31. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DEBT RELIEF MECHANISMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
‘Growth in consumer borrowing is across all sectors of societies but is relatively strong among 
low income households and sources of credit are most likely to be used when their incomes are 
disrupted for any reason. Financial difficulties however are not restricted to low income 
households, but can be found amongst all groups of consumers in our societies. Nor must it be 
suggested that consumer debtor insolvency is always credit related. There are many reasons a 
debtor becomes insolvent.’29 
2.1 Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter One, in South Africa, there are three statutory debt relief measures 
which apply in relation to personal, or consumer, insolvency and over-indebtedness. The 
common law also allows a debtor to reach a compromise with his or her debtors. This lies 
outside of the ambit of these statutory measures. This chapter deals with the various debt 
relief processes in South Africa, including substantive and procedural requirements. First, the 
common law compromise will be outlined, followed by sequestration in terms of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, administration in terms of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 
and, finally, the debt review procedure in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
Consideration will be given to whether each of these debt relief mechanisms is sufficient to 
assist a LILA debtor who is in financial distress. This will be done with a view to ascertaining 
whether any legislative reform is necessary in South Africa. 
2.2 The common law compromise 
The common law allows for a compromise to be reached between a debtor and his or her 
creditor(s).30 A compromise may or may not lead to full settlement of the obligations, 
depending on the terms of the agreement between the parties.31 
In practice, it is unlikely that a LILA debtor would resort to compromise as a debt relief 
mechanism. The lack of assets and income would negatively affect a LILA debtor’s 
bargaining power or capacity to make any reasonable offer of a feasible compromise. Very 
few creditors would be likely to agree to the sort of risky compromise that would be offered 
                                                          
29INSOL International Consumer Debt Report 2001 1. 





by such a debtor.32 In any event, ordinarily, it would only be a legally qualified practitioner, 
or a person versed in commercial practice who would propose to creditors’ possible terms for 
a compromise. From a practical perspective, a LILA debtor’s limited resources would make 
access to legal representation or the enlistment of the aid of such a commercially savvy 
representative unlikely. 
2.3 Sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act 
2.3.1 Background 
The Insolvency Act provides for the sequestration of a debtor’s estate. Sequestration requires 
an application to be brought in the High Court and, if the sequestration order is granted, the 
effect is, inter alia, that all civil proceedings are stayed, the assets of the insolvent debtor vest 
in the Master of the High Court and, once appointed, in the trustee of the insolvent estate. 
Sequestration forms a concursus creditorum, a gathering of creditors, who lodge claims 
against the estate, and the estate assets are liquidated and the proceeds distributed to creditors 
in accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency Act.33 This mechanism can be said to be 
in line with the late Meskin’s34 view that if a system does not provide debt relief to an honest 
and unfortunate debtor it is therefore promoting loan sharks and their enforcers. 
There are two ways in which a debtor’s estate may be sequestrated: voluntary surrender and 
compulsory sequestration. As its name suggests, the voluntary surrender procedure is 
initiated by the debtor himself or herself, while compulsory sequestration requires a creditor 
to apply for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate, citing the debtor as respondent. In what 
has come to be known as a ‘friendly sequestration’, it is also common practice for a debtor to 
arrange with a creditor, or someone who pretends to be a creditor, to apply for the 
compulsory sequestration of the former’s estate. This has led to abuse of the court process 
and malpractice. 
                                                          
32A Boraine and M Roestoff ‘The treatment of insolvency of natural persons in South African law – An appeal 
for a balanced and integrated approach’ in Hassane Cisse Fostering development through opportunity, inclusion 
and equity The World Bank Legal Review, Volume 5 (2014) 105. See also World Bank Report (note 6 above) 
par 133. 
33E Bertelsmann et al Mars The law of insolvency in South Africa 9 ed Juta and Co Ltd (2008) 2-3. See also 
Richter v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209 223, Walker v Syfret NO 1911 AD 141 160. 
34P Meskin ‘Advantage to creditors: A misconceived requirement’ paper delivered at Annual Banking Law 
Update at Rand Afrikaans University (1995). 
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Both voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration applications are instituted by way of 
an application to the High Court.35 This makes the sequestration process expensive. Although 
it is theoretically possible to represent oneself in the High Court, in practice, this is not 
feasible and thus sequestration would entail the cost of engaging representation by an 
attorney and an advocate, which further increases the cost of sequestration. Voluntary 
surrender and compulsory sequestration will be discussed below. 
2.3.2 Voluntary surrender 
i) Requirements 
Section 3 of the Act provides that an individual debtor or his agent may apply to the court for 
the acceptance of the surrender of his or her estate. Spouses married in community of 
property must both apply for the voluntary surrender of their joint estate.36 Before a court 
may make a sequestration order, it must be satisfied that:37 
 the formalities requirements contained in section 4 of the Insolvency Act have been 
complied with; 
 the debtor is insolvent;38 
 the debtor owns realisable property sufficient to defray all costs of sequestration, 
which will be payable out of the ‘free residue’39 of the estate; and 
 sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors. 
a) Preliminary formalities 
Preliminary formalities required by section 4 of the Insolvency Act include publication of a 
notice of surrender,40 in the Government Gazette and in a newspaper circulating where the 
debtor resides or, if he is a trader, where the business is situated. The notice must be 
published not more than thirty days and not less than fourteen days of the advertised 
application date.41 The purpose of the notice is to give creditors ample time and opportunity 
to oppose the intended application if they wish to do so. Further, within a period of seven 
                                                          
35S 149 (1) of the Act sets out which court has jurisdiction; the position is also regulated by Rule 6 of the HC 
Rules. 
36S 17(4) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
37S 6 (1) of the Insolvency Act. 
38The test for insolvency is whether the debtor’s liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets, fairly valued; see 
Ex parte Harmse 2005 1 SA 323 (N) 325; Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 3 SA 175 (T) 179.  
39‘Free residue’ is defined in s 2 of the Insolvency Act; it is the unencumbered portion of the estate assets. 
40This must comply with Form A in the First Schedule to the Insolvency Act. 
41S 4 (1) of the Insolvency Act. 
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days from the date of the publication of the said notice in the Gazette, the applicant must 
deliver or send by registered post a copy of the notice to each creditor.42 In cases where the 
applicant is an employer, he or she is also required to deliver a copy to a registered trade 
union which is representative of employees as well as to employees.43 The applicant must 
also deliver a copy to the South African Revenue Service.44 The effect of the publication of 
the notice to surrender is that a moratorium is placed upon the sale in execution of any 
property in the estate.45 
In terms of section 4 of the Insolvency Act, a debtor also has to lodge with the Master of the 
High Court a statement of affairs that conforms to the prescribed Form B in the First 
Schedule to the Act. Creditors are given an opportunity to inspect the statement of affairs 
which is required to lie open at the Master’s Office or local magistrate’s court for not less 
than fourteen days. The application for voluntary surrender, with proof of compliance with 
preliminary formalities, must be filed with the Registrar of the High Court, and, where 
applicable, copies must be delivered to a ‘consulting party’46 in accordance with section 197B 
of the Labour Relations Act47 (LRA), in case there will be dismissals of employees of the 
insolvent debtor based on operational requirements. 
b) Advantage to creditors 
‘Advantage to creditors’ is a theme that runs throughout the Insolvency Act.48 In voluntary 
surrender, the burden upon the applicant to prove ‘advantage to creditors’ is onerous: he or 
she must satisfy the court that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.  The reason 
for this, as stated by Hathorn JP, in Amod v Khan,49 is that ‘a debtor knows all about his own 
affairs and can easily prove the advantage to creditors’. ‘Creditors’, in this context, means the 
general body of creditors.50 ‘Advantage’ means a pecuniary advantage or benefit and it has 
                                                          
42S 4 (2) of the Act. Non-compliance with the set procedure has repercussions, although courts may condone it 
in appropriate circumstances; Ex parte Harmse (note 38 above) 331. 
43S 4 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act. 
44S 4 (2) (b) (iii) of the Act. 
45S 5 of the Act. 
46As contemplated by s 189(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.  
47LRA 66 of 1995. 
48C H Smith ‘The recurrent motif of the Insolvency Act – Advantage for creditors’ 7 Modern Business law 
(1985) 27. Smith points out that the phrase ‘advantage to creditors’ is found in many sections of the Act 
including other sections which point to advantage to creditors in an indirect way, such as ss13(1), 19,21, 23, 26, 
29, 30, 5, 119 and 15. 
491947 2 SA 432 N 438. 
50Peycke v Nathoo (1929) 50 NLR 178 185. This case is referred to by R G Evans ‘Friendly sequestrations, the 
abuse of the process of court and possible solutions for overburdened debtors’ 13 SA Merc L J (2001) 485,488. 
See also Lotzof v Raubenheimer 1959 1 SA 90 (O) 94; Stainer v Estate Bukes 1933 OPD 86. 
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been held that, for sequestration to be to the advantage of creditors, it should yield a greater 
return for creditors than the ordinary execution process would. It has also been held to mean 
that creditors will receive a ‘non-negligible dividend’.51 The Insolvency Act is silent on what 
would constitute a dividend that would be advantageous to creditors. Each case is decided on 
its own merits. In Ex parte Ogunlaga,52 for instance, it was held by North Gauteng High 
Court that the dividend must at least be 20 cents in the rand. The requirement of ‘advantage 
to creditors’ will be discussed further in relation to compulsory sequestration, below.53 
c) Court’s discretion 
A court may, before accepting or declining the surrender, direct the petitioner or any other 
person to appear and be examined before the court.54 The court has the discretion to refuse to 
grant the sequestration order even though the requirements have been met.55 Instances where 
a court is likely to exercise its discretion not to accept the application are, for example, 
where:56 
 the application has been opposed by the creditors, who are willing to afford the 
applicant time to meet his or her obligations; 
 there was an ulterior motive for bringing the application; 
 there has not been full disclosure of the applicant’s financial position; and it deems 
application of the National Credit Act’s machinery as being more appropriate than 
sequestration. 
All of these could potentially be applicable in a voluntary surrender by a LILA debtor, who, 
if he or she is able to access funds sufficient for a High Court application, could in all 
likelihood have brought the application solely to avoid having to continue paying 
burdensome debts. In Ex parte Ford,57 a case in which the applicant debtors might be 
described as having few assets and little or no income, the court declined to grant the 
application for voluntary surrender. This is because the court was of the view that the 
mechanisms provided by the National Credit Act offered a more appropriate solution for not 
                                                          
51Ex Parte Smith 1958 3 SA 568 (0) 371; Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 2 SA 109 
(N) 111; Meskin and Co v Friedman 1948 2 SA 555 (W) 559; London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 3 SA 591 
(D) 593. 
522011 JOL 27029 (GNP). This case is referred to by Boraine and Roestoff (note 32 above) 94. 
53See 2.3.3.i) below. 
54S 3 (3) of the Act. 
55Ex parte Hayes 1970 4 SA 94 (NC) 96. 
56R Sharrock et al  Hockly’s Insolvency Law 9 ed Juta and Co Ltd (2012) 30. 
572009 3 SA 376 (WCC). The National Credit Act is discussed at 2.5 below. 
13 
 
only the applicant debtors, but also their ‘responsible’ creditors. The court thus gave 
preference to the public policy reflected in the NCA, which requires full satisfaction of all 
responsible financial obligations by the consumer.58 The court reached its decision regardless 
of the fact that debt repayment plans were not financially feasible for the applicants.  
2.3.3 Compulsory sequestration 
i) Requirements 
A sequestrating creditor has to approach the court twice in order to obtain, first, a provisional 
order,59 and then, a return day having been set for the debtor (the respondent) to show cause 
why the order should not be made final,60 again, in order for the provisional order to be 
confirmed.61For the court to grant a sequestration order: 
 the applicant creditor must have established a liquidated claim against the debtor of 
not less than R100;62 
 the debtor must have committed an act of insolvency as envisaged in section 8 of the 
Act or be insolvent;63 and 
 there must be reason to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of 
creditors.64 
For a court to make a provisional sequestration order, it must be of the opinion that prima 
facie the above facta probanda have been established and, for a final order, it must be 
satisfied they have been established.65 If the court is not so satisfied, it is obliged to dismiss 
the application for compulsory sequestration and discharge the provisional order.66 Before the 
application may be heard, the creditor has to furnish security for costs including the fees and 
charges necessary for the finalisation of the sequestration proceedings and of all costs of 
administering the estate until a trustee has been appointed, or, if no trustee is appointed, of all 
                                                          
58Ex parte Ford (note 57 above) par 20. 
59S 10 of the Act. 
60This is in terms of s 11 of the Act. 
61S 12 of the Act. 
62Subss 9(1) and 9(3) of the Act. (Alternatively, two or more creditors must have claims of not less than R200 in 
aggregate.) See Meyer v Batten 1999 1 SA 1041 (W). 
63S 9(1) of the Act. 
64S 10 (c) and s 12(1) (c) of the Act. This is discussed by M Roestoff et al ‘The debt counseling process – 
closing the loopholes in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (2009) 12, 
4. 
65Compare ss 10 and 12 of the Act. 
66S 12(2) of the Act. 
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fees and charges necessary for discharge of the estate from sequestration.67 The applicant 
creditor must furnish a copy of the application to the debtor68 and also, where the debtor is an 
employer, to a registered trade union which represents any of the employees, and to 
employees, and also to the South African Revenue Service.69 
The creditor may not be in a position to establish that the debtor’s liabilities exceed his or her 
assets.70 Therefore, the legislature has in section 8 of the Insolvency Act created eight 
different acts or omissions, referred to as ‘acts of insolvency’,71 and proof of any one of these 
is sufficient for an order of sequestration to be granted. 
The requirement of ‘advantage to creditors’ was discussed above, in relation to voluntary 
surrender.72 However, whereas, for voluntary surrender, a court must be satisfied that 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors, the burden of proof is less onerous in 
compulsory sequestration where there must be ‘reason to believe’ that sequestration will be to 
the advantage of creditors. Further, also as mentioned above, the burden at the provisional 
order stage is lighter than at the later stage when the court is considering whether to grant a 
final order of sequestration.73  
In relation to whether it has indeed been proved that there is reason to believe that 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors, it was held by Roper J in Meskin and Co v 
Friedman74 that the facts before the court must satisfy it that, ‘there is a reasonable prospect – 
not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote – that some pecuniary 
benefit will result to the creditors’. It may be noted that, as mentioned above in relation to 
voluntary surrender, the legislature has not laid down a minimum dividend for creditors to 
constitute ‘advantage to creditors’. The North Gauteng High Court is guided by a dividend of 
20c in the rand.75 It may be noted that, for a court to find that there is ‘reason to believe’ that 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors, it is not imperative for the applicant to 
prove that the debtor has assets, but it is sufficient if it is shown that there is a reasonable 
                                                          
67S 9 (3) of the Act. 
68S 9 (4A) (a) (iv). Failure to do so may be condoned where appropriate: see Fisher v Pujol 1972 2 SA 496 (T), 
Rule 6 (2) read with Rule 6 (5) (a) of the Uniform Rules of Court. 
69S 9 (4A) (a) (i) - (iii) of the Act. See also Standard Bank of South Africa v Sewpersadh 2005 4 SA 148 (C). 
70See De Villiers NO v Maursen Properties (Pty) ltd 1983 4 SA 670 (T) 676. 
71S 8 (a) - (h). 
72See 2.3.2.i).b) above. 
73Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd (note 51 above) 113. 
74Meskin and Co (note 51 above). 
75It may be noted that some courts have been reluctant to set a dividend on the basis that this would be 
encroaching upon the duties of the legislature; see, for instance, Hillhouse v Stott 1990 4 SA 580 (W) 586. 
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prospect that substantial assets will result after proper investigation following a sequestration 
order.76 
ii) Friendly sequestration 
Due to the stringent requirement, for voluntary surrender, of proving that sequestration will 
be to the ‘advantage to creditors’, as well as the need for complying with the preliminary 
formalities required by section 4 of the Insolvency Act,  debtors commonly resort to getting a 
person to bring an application for the compulsory sequestration of his or her estate. This has 
come to be known as ‘friendly sequestration’. Very often, a debtor will simply write to his or 
her creditor, stating that he or she is unable to pay the debt. This will then constitute the act of 
insolvency under section 8 (g) of the Act on which the applicant will rely. The main object of 
this process being to assist the debtor, courts must scrutinise these cases in order to ascertain 
that an ‘advantage to creditors’ will result if the debtor’s estate is sequestrated.77 In practice, 
friendly sequestration commonly constitutes an abuse of the court process in that often an 
applicant will pose as a creditor in circumstances where there is no debt owing to him or her, 
ie, the claim is fictitious, or the value of assets is falsely inflated or the debts are under-
estimated in order to create the impression that there will be an advantage to creditors. In this 
regard, in R v Meer and others,78 Holmes J stated that: 
‘the court could guard against such abuse in two ways: firstly, by paying more regard to the 
element of advantage to creditors in the petition, especially in cases which savour of friendly 
sequestrations under section 8 (g); secondly, by refusing to grant repeated adjournments of the 
rule nisi unless satisfied, on affidavit, that such would be to the advantage of creditors.’ 
In Nell v Lubbe79 it was stated by Levenson J that: 
‘the purpose of furnishing a sworn valuation is therefore to establish the price that is likely to 
be realized from the sale of the property on what is called a forced sale so that it can be 
determined that there will be a free residue available for creditors and the advantage to 
creditors is thereby established.’ 
                                                          
76Meskin and Co (note 51 above); Lynn & Main Inc v Naidoo and Another 2006 1 SA 59 (N). 
77Epstein v Epstein 1987 4 SA 606 (C); Klemrock (Pty) Ltd v De Klerk 1973 3 SA 925 (W).See also Evans (note 
50 above) 487. 
781957 3 SA 614 (4). 
791999 3 SA 109 (W) at 111D. 
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2.3.4 Effects of sequestration 
As mentioned above,80 as soon as the sequestration order is granted, civil proceedings 
against the debtor are stayed and the assets of the insolvent debtor vest in the Master of the 
High Court and, once appointed, in the trustee of the insolvent estate. Certain assets are 
either exempted or excluded from the insolvent estate. For example, section 82(6) of the 
Insolvency Act allows an insolvent to retain, and for the exception from sale, clothing, 
bedding, household furniture and tools and other essential means of subsistence. Further, 
section 23 of the Insolvency Act provides that the insolvent will be entitled to wages and 
earnings after sequestration, subject to the trustee claiming any excess that is not needed by 
the insolvent and his family for subsistence,81 pension monies acquired before and after 
sequestration,82 and compensation for loss for personal injury or defamation suffered 
before or after sequestration.83 The insolvent is also entitled to retain certain life insurance 
policies over own life.84 The purpose of these provisions is to allow the insolvent and his 
dependants basic necessities so that they do not become a burden on the state and society 
and also to encourage the insolvent to become a productive member of society. Creditors 
must lodge claims against the estate, which is administered by the trustee. The trustee’s 
duty is, inter alia, to liquidate estate assets and, after sequestration and administration costs 
have been met out of the proceeds, to distribute the balance to creditors in accordance with 
the provisions of the Insolvency Act.85 
2.3.5 Rehabilitation 
An insolvent debtor may, on six weeks’ notice to the Master and after placing a notice of his 
or her intention in the government gazette,86 bring an ex parte application in the high court 
for an order for his or her rehabilitation. Different time periods apply, within which an 
insolvent may seek rehabilitation, depending on the circumstances.  
Section 124 (3) of the Insolvency Act permits an insolvent to apply for rehabilitation after six 
months from the date of sequestration if no claims are proved against his or her estate. 
Section 124 (2) permits an insolvent to apply for rehabilitation once twelve months have 
                                                          
80See 2.3.1 above. 
81See s 23(9) read with s 23(5). 
82See s 23(7). 
83See s 23(8). 
84See s 63 (1) (a) and s 64 (b) of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998. 
85S 91 of the Act. See also Sharrock et al (note 56 above) 130. 
86S 124 (3) (a) of the Act. 
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elapsed since the confirmation by the Master of the first trustee’s estate account, unless the 
insolvent’s estate has been sequestrated before, in which case he or she must wait for three 
years before making application for rehabilitation. Where an insolvent has been convicted of 
a fraudulent act in relation to this or a previous insolvency, then he or she can apply for 
rehabilitation only after four years of the date of sequestration. In terms of section 124, the 
Master’s positive recommendation is required in cases where an application is brought within 
four years of sequestration. It is in the court’s discretion whether to grant or decline 
rehabilitation of the insolvent.87 If an insolvent has not been rehabilitated by the court within 
a period of ten years from the date of his or her sequestration, he or she shall be deemed to be 
rehabilitated after the expiry of such period as long as no application has been made by an 
interested party not to rehabilitate the insolvent.88 Rehabilitation of an insolvent brings the 
sequestration process, and the debtor’s insolvent status, to an end.  Rehabilitation discharges 
the insolvent from liability for pre-sequestration debts and relieves him or her of all 
disabilities and restrictions resulting from sequestration.89 Thus an insolvent is able to obtain 
a ‘fresh start’. This position is in line with the World Bank Report where it is stated that ‘one 
of the principal purposes of the insolvency system for natural persons is to re-establish the 
debtor’s economic capability, in other words, economic rehabilitation’.90 
2.3.6 LILA debtors and sequestration 
Given a LILA debtor’s position, with low income and minimal assets, even if he or she is 
able to afford the costs associated with a High Court application, it is unlikely that he or 
she would be able to satisfy the court that sequestration will be to the ‘advantage to 
creditors’, in a voluntary surrender, or that his or her creditor would meet the burden 
imposed on it to show that there is reason to believe that compulsory sequestration, albeit a 
friendly one, would yield sufficient advantage to the general body of creditors. Therefore, it 
is submitted that sequestration, and consequent rehabilitation, would not be accessible to a 
LILA debtor as a debt relief option. 
                                                          
87S 127 (2) of the Act. 
88S 127 (A) (1) of the Act. 
89S 129 (1) (a) - (c) of the Act. 




2.4 Administration under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
2.4.1 Background 
Section 74 of the MCA provides for the magistrate’s court to make an order for the 
administration of a debtor’s estate. As Boraine91 explains, it is a debt relief mechanism by 
means of which debtors who finds themselves in ‘a financial predicament … [are given] a 
chance to obtain a statutory rescheduling of debt sanctioned by an order of the court’. As 
stated in Madari v Cassim,92 an administration order is ‘a modified form of insolvency 
available to small estates whereby a concursus creditorum is created easily and cost 
effectively allowing for a court-sanctioned debt arrangement’.93  
2.4.2 Requirements 
An administration order may be granted only in respect of a debtor whose total debt does not 
exceed R50 000.94 Upon application by a debtor, who is unable to pay any amount of any 
judgment debt obtained against him or her or to meet his or her financial obligations and has 
insufficient assets capable of attachment to satisfy such judgment or to meet his or her 
obligations, the magistrate’s court, where the debtor resides, carries on business or is 
employed,95 may grant an order for the administration of his or her estate.96 
The order may also be granted by the court under section 65I of the MCA.97  The court may 
make the order subject to conditions that it may deem fit with regard to security, preservation 
or disposal of assets, and realisation of movables subject to a hypothec. The administration 
order enjoys preference over a section 65 inquiry98 and therefore the court will put the inquiry 
on hold until the administration order is discharged.  
                                                          
91A Boraine ‘Some thoughts on the reform of administration orders and related issues’ De Jure (2003) 217, 217-
218; See also discussion in L Steyn ‘Statutory regulation of forced sale of the home in South Africa’ (2012) 
LLD thesis University of Pretoria 142 available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-10022012-144930/ 
accessed on 7 July 2014. 
921950 2 SA 35 (D). 
93Ibid par 38. See also Weiner v Broekhuysen 2003 4 SA 301 (SCA) at 305E-F, Jones and Buckle The Civil 
Procedure Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 9 ed (1997) 305. 
94S 74(1) (b) read with GN 1441, Government Gazette 19435 of 30 October 1998, with effect from 1 November 
1998. 
95S 74 (1) of the MCA. 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
98S 65 I (1) of the MCA. 
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The debtor must lodge with the clerk of the court a statement of affairs99 the correctness of 
which must be confirmed by an affidavit made on oath.100 An illiterate debtor must be 
assisted by the clerk of the court to complete a statement of affairs.101 However, as pointed 
out by Malanje,102 ‘in practice it is normal for an attorney to assist a consumer in preparing 
the application’. Further, the debtor is required to deliver to his or her creditors, at least three 
calendar days prior to the date appointed for hearing, personally or by registered post, a copy 
of the application for the administration order and a statement of affairs with a court case 
number.103 
2.4.3 The hearing of the application 
The hearing of the application is open to any creditor, whether he or she received the section 
74A (5) notice or not, who may object to any of the listed debts.104 Further, the court or any 
creditor or the creditor’s legal representative may interrogate the debtor with regard to his 
assets and liabilities, his present and future income and that of his wife living with him, his 
standard of living and the possibility of economising and any other matter that the court may 
deem relevant.105 The purpose of the enquiry is to establish how much a debtor can afford to 
pay weekly or monthly to the administrator. Section 74B (2) to (5) further sets out the steps 
that a court takes into consideration with regard to a debt in contention.  
2.4.4 The administration order 
The administration order must be made in the prescribed form as determined by the 
magistrates’ courts rules.106 The administration order must lay down weekly or monthly 
payments,107 in the calculation of which the court must consider the debtor’s and dependents’ 
necessary expenses, certain prescribed periodical payments which the consumer is obliged to 
                                                          
99S 74 (1) read with section 74A (1) and 5 of the MCA. 
100S 74 A (3) of the MCA. 
101S 74 A (4) of the MCA. 
102N J Malanje ‘The impact of administration orders as a redress mechanism for over-indebted consumers: a 
critical analysis’ in Nejdet D et al Globalizing businesses for the next century: visualizing and developing 
contemporary approaches to harness future opportunities (2013) 626. 
103S 74 A (5) of the MCA. 
104S 74 B (1) (a) of the MCA. 
105S 74B (1) (e) of the MCA. 




make and other payments to be paid in future, such as payments under the administration 
order.108 
When the court makes the administration order, it will appoint an administrator.109 The debtor 
will be obliged regularly to pay the administrator,110 who, after deducting a fee, will 
distribute payments to creditors.111 The fee is regarded as being an added burden for a 
debtor.112 In addition, despite the fact that a debtor makes regular payments to the 
administrator, the fees payable to the administrator reduces the amount creditors receive.113 
There are no set qualifications for a person to be an administrator and therefore anyone may 
apply to be one.  
The court will authorise the issue of either an emoluments attachment order in terms of 
section 65J of the MCA, to attach emoluments at present owing or in future accruing to the 
debtor by or from his or her employer, or a garnishee order under section 72 of the MCA for 
attaching any debt owing or accruing to the debtor by or from any person (excluding the 
state). However, a court has the power to suspend such authorisation where it deems this just 
and reasonable. 
2.4.5 Effect of administration order 
The administration order suspends proceedings that have been, and from being, instituted 
against the debtor or his or her property, although costs that have already been incurred by a 
creditor may be added by the court to the judgment debt. Individual debt enforcement is 
barred since creditors will receive payment of their debt through distributions made by an 
administrator.114 However, the court may grant leave to the creditor(s) for the enforcement of 
an objected debt in terms of section 74B (3) of the MCA and for the enforcement of a 
mortgage bond.115 On the other hand, in terms of section 74R of the MCA, an administration 
order does not preclude sequestration of the debtor’s estate. 
                                                          
108S 74 C (1), (2) and (3) of the MCA. 
109S 74 E (1) of the MCA. S 74 E (3) - (4) of the MCA sets out instances where an appointed administrator may 
or may not be required to furnish security. 
110S 74C (2) of the MCA. 
111S 74L of the MCA. 
112M A Greig ‘Administration orders as shark nets’ 117 South African Law Journal (2000) 622, 626. 
113M Kelly-Louw ‘Prevention of over-indebtedness and mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness of South 
African consumers’ in J Niemi,I Ramsay & WC Whitford (ed) Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy 
Comparative and International Perspectives (2009) 193. 
114S 74P (1) - (2) of the MCA. 
115S 74P (1) of the MCA. 
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A debtor commits an offence by incurring other debts while under administration without 
disclosing that he or she is under administration.116 The court may amend the amount of any 
installment payable by the debtor in terms of the administration order 117 and may amend an 
emoluments attachment order or a garnishee order to ensure the smooth flow of payments 
under the administration order. The court may also set either of the latter aside.118 
In terms of section 74U of the MCA, an administration order will lapse, or be discharged, 
only once the debtor has paid in full all debts that are subject to it as well as interest and other 
costs. The position therefore differs from sequestration, where a dividend is paid to creditors 
and, upon rehabilitation; the debtor is discharged from all unpaid pre-sequestration debt. 
Once all debts and interest and costs have been paid, the administrator must submit a 
certificate to this effect to the clerk of court. Creditors will also be issued with a copy of the 
certificate which was send to the clerk of court.119 
No maximum period for which the debtor will be under administration is set by section 74. In 
this respect the position differs from that where the debtor’s estate is sequestrated.  It is 
therefore possible that a debtor may remain in a situation of ‘debt servitude’ for an extended 
period,120 as occurs in many cases. This, coupled with interest charges, which will increase 
the debt, results in many debtors defaulting thus rendering the administration order 
ineffective. 
As mentioned above, an administration order may be granted only where the debtor’s total 
debt does not exceed R 50 000. This procedure therefore potentially gives debt relief only to 
a certain category of debtor. Malanje121 submits that, ‘if the monetary cap was higher it could 
also have included those who are currently excluded from the relief offered by rehabilitation 
following sequestration since they cannot prove an ‘advantage to creditors’ as required by the 
Insolvency Act’.  
It is important to note that an administration order does not include in futuro debts. These are 
specifically excluded by sections 74 (1) and 74A (2) (e) of the MCA. However, this phrase is 
not defined in the MCA and it is not clear what would constitute an in futuro debt. It was held 
                                                          
116S 74 S of the MCA. 
117S 74 Q (3) (b) of the MCA. 
118Ibid. 
119S 74U. 
120A Boraine and M Roestoff ‘Revisiting the state of consumer insolvency in South Africa after twenty years: 
The courts’ approach, international guidelines and an appeal for urgent law reform’ (Part 1) 77 THRHR (2014) 
351,354 and 358. 
121Malanje (note 102 above) 629. 
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by Corbett J122 that ‘the word “debts” in the proviso to s 74 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
means debts which are due and payable and does not include obligations to pay money in 
futuro’. It would appear therefore that instalments payable under credit agreements would not 
be included in the administration order and, if this is indeed the position, it has serious 
repercussions for the debtor. Boraine123 submits that ‘in futuro debts will not be affected by 
the administration order, and the debtor thus still has to service such debts over and above the 
payments made to the administrator’. Greig124 pointed out that, ‘…the success of an 
administration order is put seriously at risk where the order cannot include reductions of in 
futuro instalments’. Greig125 further submits that ‘…the procedure discriminates irrationally 
between debts the “whole amount of which is owing” or which are due and payable and debts 
in terms of existing and microloan agreement, repayable in instalments, which have not been 
breached by the debtor’. It is submitted that it is these very in futuro debts which, because 
they are excluded from the administration order, are likely to lead the debtor, who is under 
administration, to default.     
There has been on-going abuse of the administrative process. This contention is supported by 
Boraine126 who submitted that ‘… many individuals who were under administration orders 
relied heavily on the so-called micro-lenders in ways that aggravate their debt situations 
rather than afford debt relief’. This is one of the reasons which led to proposals for reform of 
the administration order,127 which will be discussed below.128 A recent media article alleges 
abuse of the administrative process by a law firm in KwaZulu-Natal.129 The firm has agents 
who search for debtors who are in desperate need of debt relief; they ‘…prepare necessary 
paperwork and facilitate the process of these individuals to seamlessly move through the 
legal system to be placed under administration’.130 In return these agents are paid for their 
services to Booysen and Co. The firm in this respect is alleged to be abusing the 
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123Boraine (note 27 above) 191. 
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administrative process as well as breaking rules against touting.131 The media article reports 
that ‘information in Moneywebs [agent of Booysen and Co] suggests that Booysen had 70 
000 administration order clients on his books which flowed from various agents around the 
country, especially in KZN’.132 However, Booysen denied the allegations but confirmed that 
it had less than 20 000 administration orders.133 
2.4.6 LILA debtors and administration 
While, at first glance, administration under the MCA might seem appropriate for a LILA 
debtor. This is because the costs of this magistrate’s court procedure are lower than those 
involved in sequestration and because proof of ‘advantage to creditors’ is not a requirement. 
However, it is likely that, given that there is no restriction to the period of operation of an 
administration order, with minimal excess income to apply to the payment of instalments, a 
LILA debtor will be the most vulnerable category of debtor who will remain in a situation of 
‘debt servitude’, if not for life, then for a lengthy period. Further, a LILA debtor would likely 
be most adversely affected, given the increased interest and other costs and fees payable as a 
result of the extension of the period over which much lower regular instalments would have 
to be paid. The lack of regulation of the administration order system and the abuse of the 
administration order procedure, especially by administrators charging excessive fees,134 and 
as discussed above,135 the abuse of the administration process by law firms taking advantage 
of debtors in dire need of debt relief and manipulation of the process for their own gain, it is 
submitted, have severely prejudiced debtors, including LILA debtors, who have subjected 
themselves to administration orders. 
It is conceivable that a LILA debtor might have accumulated debt in excess of R50 000. If 
this is the case, the R50 000 total debt limit will preclude a LILA debtor from seeking relief 
of his or financial distress by applying for an administration order. The exclusion of in futuro 
debts from an administration order make this an inappropriate debt relief option for a LILA 
debtor as it is anticipated that such a debtor will have a large proportion of his or her debt 
arising out of credit agreements. It is submitted that the requirements that debts must be paid 
                                                          
131Ibid. See also discussion on abuse of the administration orders by unscrupulous professionals in Boraine and 
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in full, together with interest and other costs, poses the greatest obstacle to an administration 
order as a viable debt solution for a LILA debtor. 
2.5 Debt review and debt rearrangement in terms of the National Credit Act 
2.5.1 Background 
The National Credit Act, which became fully operational in June 2007, was introduced with 
the purpose, inter alia, of providing a debt relief mechanism for debtors whose over-
indebtedness arises from credit agreements. The debt review process provides for 
rearrangement of debt, allowing debtors to repay debts arising out of credit agreements over 
an extended period in terms of a court authorised plan. The NCA also makes provision for the 
setting aside of ‘reckless credit’ granted in instances where the creditor failed to conduct an 
assessment,136 or where the assessment was carried out but the consumer did not understand 
and appreciate the risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement or entered 
into that agreement that would make him or her over-indebted.137 One of the stated aims of 
the NCA is to promote responsibility in the credit market through introduction of measures to 
prevent over-indebtedness of consumers as well as the prevention of the reckless granting of 
credit.138  The court, in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Olivier,139 re-stated this purpose as being: 
‘to provide for debt re-organization of a person who is over-indebted, thereby affording that 
person the opportunity to survive the immediate consequences of his financial distress and to 
achieve a manageable financial position.’ 
The mechanism provided by the NCA is applicable to provide relief to a consumer debtor 
who is a natural person, not a juristic person.140 It applies in relation to pre-existing ‘credit 
agreements’.141 The term ‘credit agreement’ is defined in the NCA.142 In terms of the NCA, a 
debtor may apply to the magistrate’s court to be declared over-indebted and placed under 
debt review. It is also possible for any court hearing any matter in which an allegation of 
over-indebtedness is made, to refer the debtor to a debt counsellor.143 This process will be 
discussed in more detail below. It may be noted that the NCA refers to the creditor as the 
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‘credit provider’ and to the debtor as ‘the consumer’. In the course of this discussion, the 
creditor and the debtor will also be referred to, interchangeably, using the terms chosen by 
the legislature in the NCA, as may be appropriate. 
2.5.2 Requirements and procedure 
According to section 79 of the NCA, a consumer is over-indebted if the available information 
shows that the consumer is or will be unable to discharge his or her obligations under the 
credit agreements in a timely manner, having regard to that consumer’s -  
(a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and  
(b) probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all obligations under the credit 
agreements. 
In terms of section 85 of the NCA, in any court proceeding in which a credit agreement is 
being considered, if there is an allegation that the consumer is over-indebted, the court may- 
(a) refer the a matter to a debt counsellor for evaluation of the consumer’s circumstances 
and to make recommendations to the court in accordance to section 86 (7); or 
(b) declare that the consumer is over-indebted and make any order as contemplated in 
section 87 to relieve the consumer of his or her over-indebtedness. 
Further, section 86 (1) of the NCA provides that a consumer may apply to a debt counsellor 
in the prescribed manner and form in order to be declared over-indebted. However, in terms 
of section 86 (2) of the NCA this may occur only in circumstances where the credit provider 
has not yet taken steps to enforce the credit agreement in terms of section 129 of the NCA. 
The debt counsellor may require the consumer to pay an application fee, which may not 
exceed the prescribed amount.144 Currently, this amount is set at R50.145 In terms of section 
86(4) of the NCA, a debt counsellor must, upon receipt of an application by a consumer to be 
declared over-indebted: 
(a) provide the consumer with proof of receipt of the application; 
(b) notify, in the prescribed manner and form 
(i) all credit providers that are listed in the application; and 
(ii) every registered credit bureau. 
                                                          
144S 86 (3) (a) of the NCA. 
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A consumer must submit a completed form 16 to the debt counsellor in order to be declared 
over-indebted and should also provide all material information to the debt counsellor.146 In 
order for the evaluation and debt-rearrangement to be successful, a consumer is expected to 
adhere to any requests made by the debt counsellor. The consumer must participate in good 
faith in the review and in any negotiations designed to result in responsible debt re-
arrangement.147 
A debt counsellor who has accepted an application by a consumer must within the prescribed 
time and manner determine whether he or she appears to be over-indebted.148 Further, where 
a declaration for reckless credit is sought, the debt counsellor must determine whether the 
credit agreement appears to be reckless.149 The debt counsellor will reject the application 
where it has been established that the consumer is not over-indebted.150 This can take place 
despite the fact that the debt counsellor has reached a conclusion that a particular credit 
agreement is reckless.151 On the other hand, where the debt counsellor reasonably concludes 
that the consumer is over-indebted, he or she may issue a proposal recommending that the 
magistrate’s court makes an order, where appropriate, declaring one or more of the 
consumer’s credit agreements to be reckless credit152 and that one or more of the consumer’s 
credit agreement obligations be re-arranged by: extending the period over which the price 
must be paid and reducing the amount of each payment due; and/or postponing during a 
specified period the dates on which payments are due under the credit agreement.153 
In terms of sections 83(3) and 85 of the NCA, a court may declare a consumer to be over-
indebted, may declare credit to be reckless, and may make any order re-arranging his or her 
obligations, in accordance with section 87, as mentioned above, in order to relieve such over-
                                                          
146Regulation 24 provides that a ‘consumer who wishes to apply to a debt counsellor to be declared over-
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indebtedness. Before doing so, the court will consider whether the debtor is able to meet his 
or her current financial obligations154and also the expected date of full satisfaction by the 
consumer of his or her obligations under the credit agreement.155 It does this on the 
assumption that a consumer will make full payment of all of his debts in accordance with the 
proposed court order. 
Where a credit agreement is suspended, section 84(1) (c) imposes a moratorium against its 
enforcement. However, after suspension, the rights and obligations of the credit provider are 
revived and become fully enforceable, except where the court orders otherwise.156 
A credit provider may give notice to terminate the review at any time after the lapse of 60 
days since the date of application by the consumer for debt review.157 It has been held that, 
for the credit provider to be entitled to do this, the consumer must be in default of the 
obligation(s) originally agreed upon.158 Further, upon giving the requisite notice, the 
magistrate’s court may make an order to resume the debt review on conditions that it 
considers just and reasonable.159 
2.5.3 Effect of debt review, allegation of over-indebtedness or debt re-arrangement 
order 
A consumer who has filed an application for debt review with a debt counsellor, in terms of 
section 86 (1) of the NCA, or who has alleged in court that he or she is over-indebted, must 
not incur any further charges under a credit facility or enter into any further credit agreement 
(other than a consolidation agreement) with any credit provider until one of the following 
events has taken place: 
(a) the debt counsellor has rejected the application and the prescribed time period for 
direct filing in terms of section 86 (9) has expired without the consumer having so 
applied; 
(b) the court has determined that the consumer is not over-indebted, or has rejected a debt 
counsellor’s proposal or the consumer’s application; or 
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(c) the court has made an order, or the consumer and credit providers have made an 
arrangement, rearranging or consolidating the consumer’s obligations and the 
consumer has fulfilled these obligations.160 
In terms of section 88 (3), a credit provider who has received notice of court proceedings 
contemplated in terms of section 83161 or section 85162 or a notice from a debt counsellor in 
terms of section 86 (4)(b)(i),163 may not exercise or enforce by litigation or other judicial 
process any right or security under the credit agreement until the consumer is in default under 
the credit agreement, and either one of the events mentioned above has occurred or the 
consumer has defaulted in terms of a re-arrangement agreed between the consumer and credit 
providers, or ordered by the court or the Tribunal. 
2.5.4 LILA debtors and debt review and debt re-arrangement 
The debt review process and debt relief mechanisms provided by the NCA apply only in 
respect of obligations arising out of credit agreements, as set out in section 8 of the NCA. 
Therefore it offers no relief in respect of other types of debt. According to Roestoff and 
Coetzee,164 ‘debt review, like administration,  amounts to no more than a reorganisation of 
the consumer’s credit agreement debt without providing any discharge’. Therefore, a LILA 
debtor, who has the wherewithal to successfully apply for debt review and debt re-
arrangement by order of the magistrate’s court, would be likely to remain in debt servitude 
for an extended period,165 as would similarly be the position under an administration order, 
discussed above.166 This therefore prolongs the over-indebtedness of the debtor instead of 
assisting the over-indebted debtor.167 Compared to sequestration, to undergo debt review does 
not require proof of ‘advantage to creditors’. However, another significant difference 
between sequestration, on the one hand, and debt review and debt re-arrangement, on the 
other, which would have an adverse impact for a LILA debtor, is that the latter process does 
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not offer any measure of discharge from liability for debt as the NCA envisages that all debts 
will be paid in full.168  
2.6 Reform initiatives in South Africa 
2.6.1 Background 
A number of proposals have been put forward, during more than the past decade, which 
would have the effect of reforming aspects of consumer debt relief measures that are 
available.169 However, of these, it is only the NCA that has thus far seen the light of day. 
Mostly on account of poor drafting, the NCA already requires amendment and the National 
Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 has been enacted.170 All that remains is for the effective 
date to be announced. Other proposals for reform that have a bearing on sequestration and on 
administration orders will be discussed briefly. 
2.6.2 Draft Insolvency Bill 2000 
After a review of the South African law of insolvency that lasted more than ten years, in 
2000, the South African Law Reform Commission published its report, including a Draft 
Insolvency Bill and a memorandum. Two notable aspects may be mentioned here. First, 
despite calls by various commentators to do away with the creditor orientated insolvency 
system,171 the requirement of ‘advantage to creditors’ was retained in the Draft Insolvency 
Bill.172 Another significant proposal by the South African Law Reform Commission was for 
the insertion of a new section 74X in the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which would provide for a 
pre-liquidation composition between a debtor and his or her creditors in terms of which the 
majority of creditors could bind the minority.173 The proposed section 74X was never 
enacted, but it is still ‘on the table’ in the form of section 118 of the latest 2013 unofficial 
amended version of the original Draft Insolvency Bill, which is now referred to as the 
Insolvency Bill. According to Steyn174  
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‘Various aspects of the proposed procedure were unclear, including, for example, that it did 
not indicate what the relationship would be between the pre-liquidation composition and debt 
relief measures, such as administration orders, and whether the pre-liquidation composition 
process would become a pre-requisite for every insolvency case.’ 
The procedure is commenced by an over-indebted debtor who wants to offer their creditors a 
composition.175 The total debt is not supposed to exceed R200 000.176 The section requires a 
majority of concurrent creditors that accounts for two thirds in value must vote in favour of 
the composition.177 Secured creditors and preferent creditors will not be affected by the 
composition unless they consent in writing to it.178 At acceptance of the composition, the 
debtor signs a copy of the composition and completes a sworn statement with the 
administrator.179 The procedure is administrative in nature since it is administered by the 
administrator. The composition becomes binding on all creditors who received notice of the 
hearing or who appeared at the hearing.180 The application for composition and application 
for the administration order can also be converted to liquidation proceedings.181Upon 
acceptance of the composition, the debtor may apply for rehabilitation without the 
requirement of advantage to creditors.182 According to Roestoff and Coetzee,183 ‘the proposed 
measure is supposed to afford debt relief to debtors who cannot show an advantage to 
creditors and are therefore excluded from the liquidation process’. This proposed statutory 
pre-liquidation composition therefore poses a potential opportunity for a measure of relief for 
LILA debtors. However, Boraine and Roestoff submit that:184 
‘the current proposals of the South African Law Reform Commission will not, if 
implemented, address the ineffectiveness of the South African insolvency system to provide 
proper debt relief to insolvent or over-indebted individuals.’ 
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2.6.3 Reform of administration orders 
Abuse of the administration process became rife,185 which led to an investigation into 
potential reform.186 The investigation came to a halt pending the enactment of the NCA, 
although it has been brought back to life.187 There are, currently, proposals that the 
administration order should have a time limitation whereby the debt will lapse at a statutory 
stipulated time unlike lapsing at discharge of the costs and full payment of creditors.188 
According to Boraine189 with reference to the proposals he submitted that ‘the fact that there 
is no time limitation is also a concern especially in view of some international norms190 
where a three to five year period for repayment plans of this nature applies’.  
2.7 Preliminary comments on the position of a LILA debtor in relation to debt relief 
options in South Africa 
Even though a common law compromise with creditors is potentially and theoretically at the 
disposal of a LILA debtor, it is not a realistic option. It is an unlikely prospect, due to a lack 
of assets and income, that a LILA debtor would be in a financial position to make a 
reasonable offer of a feasible compromise that would be attractive to a creditor. Very few 
creditors would agree to such a risky compromise in a non-statutory mechanism that they 
would not necessarily trust.191   
Further, realistically, it is unlikely that a debt-stressed LILA debtor, with insufficient funds to 
enable him or her to enlist the services of a legal representative, would be in a position to 
reach, or even to negotiate, compromises with all of his or her creditors.  
While, for all debtors, sequestration seems an attractive option on account of the discharge 
from liability for debt that comes with consequent rehabilitation, as discussed above,192 
having to meet the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement in order for a sequestration order to 
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be granted, is an insurmountable hurdle for a LILA debtor to overcome. This is because a 
LILA debtor has few assets and minimal disposable income or other means to cover the costs 
of the procedure and for sale of assets to yield a dividend for creditors.  Further, to add to the 
burden, the cost of legal representation and litigation in the high court, in order to obtain this 
form of relief, would be prohibitive factors for a LILA debtor. 
Therefore, although the procedure provides for debt discharge, it is only limited to a certain 
type of debtor – one who can afford high court litigation and in respect of whose estate 
sequestration would yield a non-negligible dividend for creditors. It may therefore be stated 
that the procedure differentiates between different types of debtor. This view is supported by 
Evans, who submits that:193 
‘Insolvency legislation invariably almost overreaches itself in regulating the position of the 
different classes of creditors. However, the debtor is apparently merely defined, with no 
further attention being given to him, her or it. Although the Act does not provide for different 
classes of debtors who are treated differently in accordance with differing or changing 
circumstances, it does in fact differentiate between those ‘rich debtors’ who are able to prove 
advantage to creditors, and the ‘poor debtors’ who cannot. This raises the question whether, 
under present legislation, the door has been opened for these ‘poor debtors’ to question the 
constitutionality of their position.’ 
Sequestration by voluntary surrender may therefore be said to be inaccessible for a LILA 
debtor.  
In addition, creditors find it practically impossible compulsorily to sequestrate the estate of a 
LILA debtor for similar reasons: a creditor will have difficulty proving to the court that there 
is reason to believe that sequestration will be to the ‘advantage of creditors’. Roper J, in 
Meskin and Co v Friedman,194 held that, ‘the facts before the court must satisfy it that there is 
a reasonable prospect  not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote 
that some pecuniary benefit will result to the creditors’. Roper J195 added that the fact that 
there are no assets is not important but ‘even if there is none at all, but there are reasons of 
thinking that, as a result of enquiry under the Act, some assets may be revealed or recovered 
for benefit of creditors, that is sufficient’. It would therefore be a waste of a creditor’s 
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resources to apply for a LILA debtor’s sequestration. Further, friendly sequestration would be 
a likely proposition because of the lack of means of the debtor himself or herself.   
As shown above, the administration order is an alternative to sequestration specifically 
designed for a debtor with minimum assets and limited debts. The order is available to an 
over-indebted debtor who cannot meet the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement and whose 
debt does not exceed R50 000.196 Therefore, a LILA debtor whose debt exceeds R50 000 
cannot obtain this form of debt relief. It must also be borne in mind that the administration 
order does not include in futuro debts. This would mean that, instead of having his or her debt 
administered under a single debt relief measure, the LILA debtor would have the frustration 
of paying in futuro debts, which would apparently include future instalments payable under 
credit agreements, in addition to the payments required in terms of the administration order. 
This would likely impact the LILA debtor negatively, as was discussed above.197 
The administration procedure does not have a debt discharge provision and therefore all debts 
must be paid in full.198 This negatively affects a LILA debtor, who has minimal excess 
income to apply to payments, which would need to be set very low. This, in turn, would mean 
that the debts would take an inordinately long time to pay. Another factor would be that 
interest and administration costs would further escalate the total amount payable. Bearing in 
mind also that section 74 of the MCA does not impose a limitation on the duration of an 
administration order; the result is that a LILA debtor would be likely to remain in debt 
servitude for a very long time, if not for his or her entire life.199 
As discussed above,200 the debt review procedure provides relief to a debtor with debts 
arising out of ‘credit agreements’ as defined in the NCA. A LILA debtor who cannot meet 
the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement and whose total debt exceeds R50 000 would have to 
resort to the debt review procedure. However, a LILA debtor whose debt is not ‘credit 
agreement’ debt would have no other option available to him or her but will be left to the 
mercy of creditors. Thus, one can say that the system is one of ‘all or nothing’ since it 
determines who can and who cannot get debt relief and it is possible that some, particular 
LILA debtors, will have no debt relief option at their disposal. 
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Further, even if a LILA debtor can obtain debt relief under the NCA, because it does not 
provide for debt discharge, there will be no opportunity to obtain a ‘fresh start’ as would a 
debtor whose estate had been sequestrated.  
The debt relief mechanisms under the MCA and NCA, both, falls short of Spooner’s 
submission in relation to debt discharge: 201  
‘Debt discharge allows personal insolvency law to alleviate poverty and deprivation among 
the inevitable financial failed households and safeguard the basic needs of all society 
members, while removing households from financial exclusion by providing a fresh start.’ 
2.8 Conclusion 
The South African debt relief measures’ entry requirements clearly show that each one has 
limited applicability. Each of the available mechanisms targets a certain type of debtor and, 
for the most part, LILA debtors will be excluded. Sequestration is not an option for a LILA 
debtor because ‘advantage to creditors’ will not be established. Even though some LILA 
debtors may qualify to undergo debt review and debt re-arrangement under the NCA, and/or 
for administration under the MCA, it is imperative to note that there is no form of discharge 
afforded to a debtor in either of these circumstances. The on-going abuse under the 
administration process, and the costs and fees involved, make the mechanism unfavourable 
for a LILA debtor. Clearly, the system in South Africa does not strike a balance between the 
interests of debtors, and particularly LILA debtors, and their creditors. This therefore calls for 
the legislature to revisit this area of law. 
The next chapter will provide a brief comparison of consumer debt relief mechanisms 
available to LILA debtors in foreign jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DEBT RELIEF MEASURES AVAILABLE TO LILA DEBTORS 
IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
‘If access to debt relief is too hard then people will be stuck in a debt trap with no chance of 
escape.  If access is too easy then creditors will lose money that could and should have been 
paid. A balance must be struck, but debtors should be able to bankrupt themselves if they are 
genuinely unable to pay their debts.’ (A Wilson)202 
3.1 Introduction 
Consumer over-indebtedness is a worldwide phenomenon. In an attempt to address this 
predicament a number of countries have implemented remedial measures to deal with over-
indebtedness and in an endeavour to ensure that debtors obtain a ‘fresh start’.203 It may be 
noted that low income is a feature which is regarded as an obstacle in the way of debtors’ 
overcoming over-indebtedness.204 In this chapter a broad, comparative survey will be 
undertaken of legal provisions applicable in various countries, namely, the United States of 
America, England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland and New Zealand, which cater for LILA 
debtors.  
3.2 The United States of America 
3.2.1 Background 
Originally, in the United States of America (USA), bankruptcy laws provided for creditor-
orientated remedies against the debtor derived from the English bankruptcy laws in terms of 
which debtors who tried to avoid their debts were imprisoned.205 The reasoning behind this 
was to thwart fraudulent deeds by debtors, notwithstanding the fact that the bankruptcy laws 
did not provide rehabilitation to a truthful but unfortunate debtor.206 This position was later 
changed, influenced by the English law which transitioned in the 18th century in the direction 
                                                          
202A Wilson, Deputy Minister for Enterprise and lifelong learning, see Accountant in Bankruptcy, ‘Low income, 
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of granting debt discharge to a debtor.207 The American bankruptcy law developed further 
ultimately leading to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy 
Code). The bankruptcy laws in the United States of America were elucidated in the US 
Supreme Court case of Local Loan Co v Hunt.208 The court held that one of the primary 
purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws: 
‘…is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him 
to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business 
misfortunes…’ 
The USA federal bankruptcy laws are regarded as having provided an example for several 
international law reform initiatives due to the easing of the previous, strict prerequisites for 
debt discharge.209 The reasoning behind this is to provide a debtor who is in a financial 
predicament a ‘fresh start’. This goal is accomplished through the bankruptcy discharge, 
which releases debtors from personal liability from specific debts and forbids creditors 
thereafter from ever taking any action or recourse against the debtor.210  
The Bankruptcy Code provides consumer debtors with two primary alternatives by means of 
which to obtain debt relief. These alternatives are located in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, 
respectively.  In terms of Chapter 7, the debtor’s assets are liquidated and he or she receives 
an immediate debt discharge. On the other hand, Chapter 13 allows for the re-organisation of 
a debtor’s prepetition debt and finally, on completion of a repayment plan, a discharge of the 
prepetition debt.211 The procedure requires regular income.212 Each alternative suits a 
particular type of debtor. In the case of LILA debtors, where there are insufficient non-
exempt assets available for sale and inadequate surplus income to discharge towards a 
repayment plan under Chapter 13, only the Chapter 7 procedure would be of relevance. This 
will be now discussed. 
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3.2.2Chapter 7 liquidation procedure 
The Bankruptcy Code states that for a debtor to be eligible for relief under Chapter 7, the 
debtor may be an individual, a partnership or corporation or any other business entity.213 It 
further states that a joint petition may be filed by a husband and a wife.214 The procedure may 
be used by a debtor, whether solvent or insolvent, and there is no limitation on the amount of 
debt. The Bankruptcy Code, as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) introduced a ‘means test’ which determines if the debtor 
is eligible for the Chapter 7 liquidation procedure or whether he or she is obliged to follow 
the Chapter 13 debt rescheduling procedure. The BAPCPA ‘means test’ is income based and 
is designed to allow only those who truly cannot pay their debts to use the Chapter 7 
procedure. Calitz215 submits that ‘the enactment of the BAPCPA in the USA has reversed the 
liberal “fresh start” attitude and adopted a stance considerably more conservative in its 
philosophy as was the case previously’. The BAPCPA introduced measures to curtail abuse, 
prohibit fraud and crime related debts.216  
There is no requirement for a debtor to prove that the process will lead to the ‘advantage of 
creditors’. However, the BAPCPA requires a debtor who is filing for debt relief under 
Chapter 7 or, for that matter, any other Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, within 180 days 
before filing to receive credit counselling from an approved credit counselling agency either 
in an individual or a group briefing.217 
The Chapter 7 procedure is characterised by an orderly, court supervised procedure,218 which 
is simple and inexpensive.219 The debtor is required to pay a certain fee. If a debtor fails to 
pay the fee this may result in dismissal of the case.220 However, a court may waive payment 
of the fee221 or may allow the debtor to pay the fee in instalments in circumstances where he 
or she is unable to discharge it in a single payment.222 Such debtor should have an income 
                                                          
21311 U.S.C §§ 101 (41), 109(b). 
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which is less than 150% of the poverty level, as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.223 Upon 
acceptance of the petition, the process allows the trustee to collect, liquidate and realise the 
debtor’s assets and this will be followed by a distribution of the proceeds to the creditors.224 
The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to keep certain property that is exempted under the 
federal bankruptcy laws or under the laws of the debtor’s home state.225 Evans226 submits that 
this property will empower a debtor to have a ‘fresh start’.  Ferriell and Janger227 submit that 
the ‘fresh start’ is not available to every debtor but only to a truthful debtor and that this 
shows that there is an ethical aspect to it which cannot be overlooked. It is Evans’s228 
submission that usually, in Chapter 7 cases, the debtors have insufficient non-exempt 
property, hence there may not be any real liquidation of the debtor’s assets and the debtor is 
discharged promptly since there will be no sale. These may be referred to as ‘no asset 
cases’.229 However, in cases where there are assets creditors will get a dividend from the 
realised assets realised by the trustee. A debtor has a choice whether to pay the secured debts 
under a reaffirmation agreement230 or to surrender the secured property.231    
3.2.3 The moratorium 
A petition under Chapter 7 grants the debtor a moratorium against enforcement of his debt by 
creditors.232 This ‘automatic stay’ therefore bars creditors from using enforcement actions 
such as wage garnishments and from bringing lawsuits against the debtor. However, certain 
types of actions against the debtor are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code.233 
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3.2.4 Debt discharge 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an automatic debt discharge to an individual 
debtor but not to corporations and partnerships.234 In some cases, the court may revoke the 
discharge where it was obtained as a result of fraud.235 Discharge will not be granted in cases 
where the debtor was granted a discharge within the last eight years of the filing in the 
present case.236 Furthermore, not all debts are dischargeable under the Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.237 Non-dischargeable debts include an obligation to pay alimony, to 
provide child support, to pay certain taxes, and to discharge debts for certain educational 
benefit overpayments or loans made or guaranteed by a government unit, and debts owing as 
damages for wilful and malicious injury.238 Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code achieves two 
things: the liquidation of the debtor’s assets, followed by debt discharge.239 According to 
Roestoff and Coetzee,240 there is no connection between the suitability for discharge and the 
amount paid towards the creditors. The discharge is applicable to unsecured debts only.241 
The procedure therefore allows a debtor a speedy discharge from liability for debt.242 
3.3. England and Wales  
3.3.1 Background 
The modern bankruptcy system in England and Wales is based on the ‘fresh start’ policy.243 
The Enterprise Act of 2002, which came into effect on 1 April 2004, introduced liberal 
changes that reflected the legislative purpose of, inter alia, striking a balance between the 
interests of creditors and debtors. An example is that, previously, debtors in England and 
Wales who had been declared bankrupt were discharged after three years. However, the 
Enterprise Act amended the Insolvency Act 1986 to provide for automatic discharge after one 
year.244  Thus McKenzie Skene and Walters245 aptly describe bankruptcy as ‘a debt relief tool 
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taking the form of a statutory composition designed to balance the interests of debtors and 
creditors’. 
There are five procedures available to individual debtors in England and Wales. One is in 
terms of the common law, the debt management plan (DMP). There are also four formal, 
statutory procedures: bankruptcy;246 individual voluntary arrangement (IVA), also provided 
for by the Insolvency Act of 1986, as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 as well as the 
Insolvency Rules 1986 with 2010 amendments; the county court administration order 
(CCAO), provided for by the County Courts Act 1984; and the debt relief order (DRO) 
provided for by the Insolvency Act 1986, as amended by the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act of 2007.247 
It may be noted that, in England and Wales, as a general rule, the debtor has the option to 
choose which particular debt relief procedure suits him or her; the decision is not made by the 
administrative body or the court. Although an option for a LILA debtor may be a DMP, 
which would lead to rescheduling of debts and consolidated into a single monthly payment 
for distribution to creditors,248 the need for the debtor to have a measure of surplus income 
would probably render this unsuitable. In order to enter bankruptcy, a debtor is required to 
pay an initial sum of, currently, £705 (a deposit fee of £525 and a court fee of £180).249 The 
fee requirement makes it impossible for a LILA debtor to access bankruptcy although it may, 
however, be waived where a debtor cannot afford it.250 The IVA, provided for in Part VIII of 
the Insolvency Act 1986, is a binding consensual arrangement between a debtor and a 
creditor on terms set out in a proposal for a repayment plan drawn up with the assistance of 
an Insolvency Practitioner. For a LILA debtor with insufficient surplus income to apply 
towards a repayment plan, an IVA would not be an option. CAAOs, in terms of the County 
Courts Act 1984, were designed for debtors with debts of less than £5000, with not more than 
one county court or High Court judgment debt and with limited assets. One payment per 
month to the local court would be required and the court would distribute the money to 
creditors. Therefore, this procedure would be a possible option for LILA debtors, although, 
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again, only if there is any surplus income to be paid into court each month. The debtor must 
pay a fee of 10% of the amount of each payment. The debts must be paid in full. CCAOs 
have largely fallen into disuse.251 The DRO, was introduced specifically as a ‘no income, no 
assets’ (NINA) procedure for the relief of debtors who had virtually no surplus income and 
no significant assets.252 The DRO will therefore now be discussed. 
3.3.2Debt relief order (DRO) 
The DRO was enacted to fill lacunae that previously existed in the provision of debt relief for 
those who could not pay their debts.253 Access to a DRO is narrow. The debtor is required to 
pay a £90 entrance fee.254 To be eligible for a DRO, the debtor must: not owe more than 
£15,000; not have assets the total value of which exceeds £300; have a maximum surplus 
income of £50 per month; and not have already been subject to debt relief order in the last six 
years.255 The debts must not fall in the categories of those excluded in terms of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, which include certain prescribed, secured debts.256 The Insolvency 
Service recently held a consultation and is currently conducting a review of the DRO regime 
with a view to establishing whether the eligibility requirements should be changed and how it 
may be improved.257  
Debt relief orders are not court based, but are administrative in nature. Spooner258 points out 
that the procedure is a ‘low-cost and procedurally uncomplicated procedure, minimising 
transaction costs and artificial barriers to entry which exclude “low net worth” debtors whose 
financial situations nonetheless are liable to trigger externalities’. The debtor makes an 
application to the Official Receiver through an approved intermediary.259 In this regard an 
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approved intermediary is referred to by section 251U (1) as an individual who is vexed with 
authority to act as a mediator between an applicant for debt relief order and the Official 
Receiver. The application must incorporate a list of all debts due, including interest or any 
other amounts owing, and the creditor to whom each debt is owed.260 Further, it must contain 
details of security provided in respect of any of the debts261 as well as information about the 
debtor’s affairs, including debts and liabilities, his or her income and assets.262 The Official 
Receiver has discretion either to accept the application and grant the debt relief order in the 
prescribed manner263 in relation to the qualifying debts264 or to refuse the application.265  
3.3.3The moratorium 
The debt relief order stays all debt management arrangements that were in force preceding 
the grant of the order.266 A moratorium is provided in respect of debts that qualify under the 
order.267 The moratorium has the effect that it stays an action for remedy against the debtor 
by the creditor.268 Consequently, the creditor may not lodge a petition, including a bankruptcy 
petition, or take any action or institute legal proceedings against the debtor except where 
permission is granted.269 However, secured creditors’ rights are not affected, but remain 
intact.270 The moratorium applies for one year, commencing on the effective date of the 
order, 271although it may be terminated early or extended in certain circumstances.272 
3.3.4 Debt discharge 
Upon the lapse of the moratorium period, ie., after one year from the start date of the DRO, 
the debtor will be discharged from liability for all the qualifying debts specified in the order 
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(including all interest, penalties and other sums which may have become payable in relation 
to those debts since the application date).273 
3.4 Scotland 
3.4.1 Background 
Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985,274 there were very few personal 
bankruptcies in Scotland. A reason for this was that a trustee would frequently decline to act 
where there were insufficient assets, since the trustee’s remuneration was paid out of the 
debtor’s assets. In an endeavour to address this situation, provision was made in the 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, when it was enacted, for public funding to be applied to pay 
a trustee to administer cases where the debtor had minimal assets.275 
Bankruptcy law in Scotland has undergone comprehensive reform in recent years and, as a 
result the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 has been amended in a number of significant 
respects.276 As McKenzie Skene has outlined, various reforms similar to those introduced in 
England and Wales by the Enterprise Act, were effected. The period of a debtor’s bankruptcy 
was reduced from three years to one year.277 Further, provisions were introduced to 
streamline the sequestration procedure in order to make it more efficient, cost-effective and 
user-friendly. Sequestration applications by a debtor are now handled by the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy, instead of the court, and all other bankruptcy procedures are dealt with in the 
sheriff court,278 thus relieving the Court of Session of this burden. Most significantly, for 
purposes of this study, the Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007 introduced new 
provisions to make sequestration more accessible to debtor with little or no assets or 
income.279 
The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, as amended, offers three debt relief mechanisms, 
namely, sequestration, the protected trust deed (PTD) and the debt arrangement scheme 
(DAS).The PTD and DAS require a steady surplus income to be applied to outstanding debts 
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and, therefore, are not suitable for a LILA debtor. The sequestration procedure, the equivalent 
of bankruptcy in England and Wales, involves liquidation of a debtor’s assets.280 Prior to the 
coming into operation of new provisions under the Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 
2007, strict entrance criteria and post-bankruptcy restrictions posed insurmountable hurdles 
for a LILA debtor to obtain debt relief through sequestration. 281 In the circumstances, the 
legislature introduced a new section 5A into the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, via the 
Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007 and supporting regulations282 that came into 
operation on 1 April 2008, to facilitate LILA debtors’ access to sequestration.283 The new 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act’s low income, low asset (LILA) route into bankruptcy was 
reviewed by the Accountant in Bankruptcy in 2009 and, although it was found to be a 
success,284 the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014, which has already received 
Royal Assent, will in April 2015 bring into effect amendments to the Bankruptcy (Scotland) 
Act 1985 to repeal the low income, low asset procedure and replace it with a new minimal 
asset procedure for LILA debtors.285 Both the current and newly assented to LILA bankruptcy 
procedures will be discussed below. 
3.4.2 The low income, low asset route into bankruptcy for LILA debtors 
The procedure is available to a debtor who is unable to pay his or her debts where each of the 
conditions in section 5A are met. 286  The debtor must pay an application fee of £100, which 
may be paid in instalments.287 The debtor’s gross weekly income must not exceed £247.60, 
excluding any social security benefits or income received by any member of the family.288 
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The debtor must not own land289 nor any single asset worth more than £1,000 and total assets 
must not be worth more than £10 000.290 Assets such as household appliances, tools for 
upkeep of the household and children’s toys are exempted.291 However, the Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 1985 makes further provision, in terms of section 5B, that a certificate of 
sequestration may be granted to a debtor who is unable to pay his or her debts as they fall 
due. This therefore makes it easier for a LILA debtor who is unable to fulfil the conditions for 
application which are set out in section 5A. 
The debtor’s application for sequestration may be determined by the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy. The sheriff also has jurisdiction in respect of the debtor’s petition for 
sequestration.292 The process is therefore administrative in nature and there is no court 
process involved – a change from the previous position where the Court of Session awarded 
or recalled bankruptcies.293 The award of sequestration shall be made by the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy where he or she is satisfied that the application is made in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act and any other provisions under the Act.294 
3.4.3 Debt Discharge 
A debtor receives a discharge automatically after a period of one year after the date of 
sequestration.295 The discharge has the effect of discharging all the debts and obligations that 
were subject to the sequestration.296 There are various types of debts that are not 
dischargeable.297 A discharged debtor has to apply to the Accountant in Bankruptcy for the 
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290S 5A (4) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 and reg 3(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 
(Low Income, Low Asset Debtors etc.) Regulations 2008.  
291The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (Low Income, Low Asset Debtors etc.) Regulations 2008 One Year 
Review available at http://www.aib.gov.uk/publications/lila-one-year-review-2009 accessed on 28 October 
2014. 
292S 9 (1) and s 9 (1A).  
293Accountant in Bankruptcy Scotland Insolvency Service Changes for debtors and Creditors available at 
http://www.aib.gov.uk/guidance/main-changes-debtors-and-creditors accessed on 30 October 2014. 
294S 12 (1) (a). 
295S 54 (1). 
296S 55 (1). 
297S 55 (2).These debts include liability to pay a fine or other penalty due to the Crown, debts related to fraud or 
breach of trust, liability under a compensation order within the meaning of section 249 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, child support maintenance, and student loan debts. 
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issuing of a certificate of discharge.298 However, a trustee or creditor may lodge an 
application to defer the debtor’s discharge.299 
3.4.4 The prospective minimal assets procedure for LILA debtors 
Sections 5 to 7 of the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 will introduce new 
provisions and a new Schedule A1 into the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, thus creating a 
new sequestration procedure where a debtor ‘has few assets’. To be eligible to use this 
procedure, the debtor must be assessed by ‘the common financial tool’ as not having to make 
a debtor’s contribution or the debtor must be in receipt of a prescribed payment for a period 
of at least six months preceding the date of application.300 The debtor’s total debt must not be 
less than £1500 and should not exceed £1700.301 Further, the total value of the debtor’s assets 
must not exceed £2000302 and the value of any single asset of the debtor should not exceed 
£1000.303 The debtor must not own land.304 The debtor will also be able to utilise this 
procedure where the debtor has within the prescribed period been granted a certificate for 
sequestration of the estate in accordance with section 5B of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 
1985.305 The debtor will be barred from using this minimal asset procedure if he has used it in 
the last ten years, or if he has been sequestrated in the last five years306 Provision is made for 
assets, which would be excluded from vesting in the Accountant in Bankruptcy as trustee, 
likewise to be excluded in this minimal assets procedure307 and the debtor will be allowed to 
keep and make use of a vehicle the value of which does not exceed£3000.308 The award of 
sequestration will be made by the Accountant in Bankruptcy.309 
In terms of a new section 54C of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, the debtor will receive 
discharge from debt six months after the date on which sequestration was awarded, upon 
which the debtor may apply to the Accountant in Bankruptcy for a certificate of discharge.310 
                                                          
298Ibid. 
299S 54 (3). 
300S 5(1) of the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 inserts a new s 5 (2 ZA) (a) (i) of the 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. 
301This will be a new s 5(2 ZA) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. 
302Ibid s 5(2 ZA) (c). 
303Ibid s 5 (2 ZA) (d). 
304Ibid s 5 (2 ZA) (e). 
305Ibid s 5 (2ZA (f) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. 
306Ibid s 5 (2 ZA) (g) - (h). These apply where no award of sequestration has been made within those time 
frames. 
307Ibid s 5 (2 ZB) (a). 
308Ibid s 5 (2 ZB) (b). 
309Ibid s 6 (1D) (b). 
310Ibid s 54 C (1) - (2). 
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A new section 55A contains conditions attaching to a discharge in terms of section 54C. 
These include, for example, restrictions placed, for a period of six months after discharge, on 
a debtor obtaining credit and incurring debt and imposing an obligation on the debtor to 
inform persons that he has been given a discharge subject to such conditions.311 Further, a 
new section 55B provides for sanctions, such as payment of a fine and imprisonment, to be 
applicable where the debtor does not comply with section 55A debt discharge conditions. 
Thus it is evident that Scotland has made great strides in the right direction, in accordance 
with international insolvency principles by putting in place, and even improving upon, debt 
relief measures to accommodate LILA debtors who in many cases are victim of unforeseen 
and unfortunate circumstances. 
3.5 Ireland 
3.5.1 Background 
Major reform has recently been brought about in Ireland with the introduction of the Personal 
Insolvency Act of 2012 (PIA), with the objective, inter alia, of putting in place measures to 
alleviate over-indebtedness and to lessen its adverse consequences for economic activity in 
the state.312 Previously, the bankruptcy procedure was strict and the law ‘failed to distinguish 
between the “can pay” and “won’t pay” debtors’.313 Its failure to provide appropriate debt 
relief mechanisms for debtors prompted proposals for out of court processes, with easier 
access for debtors.314 This is in line with Spooner’s315 argument that the ‘law should provide 
open and uncomplicated access to debt relief procedures’. The PIA introduced significant 
changes to allow a debtor, who meets the debt relief entry requirements, to earn a ‘fresh 
start’.   
In Ireland, debtors may enter into an informal voluntary arrangement with their creditors.316 
However, this would not be a practical option for LILA debtors, considering their financial 
position, as creditors would be unlikely to agree to this. The statutory debt settlement 
                                                          
311See s 7 (2) of the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 which creates s 55 A (2) - (6). 
312Preamble to the Personal Insolvency Act of 2012. 
313Spooner (note 203 above) 292 footnote omitted. 
314Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Consultation paper on Personal debt management and debt 
enforcement¶¶3.317 (2009) available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/Consultation%20Paper%20on%20Personal%20D
ebt%20Management%20and%20Debt%20Enforcement_FINAL%20DRAFT.pdf accessed on 1 September 2014. 
315Spooner (note 201 above) 36. 
316Spooner (note 203 above) 251. 
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mechanisms provided by the PIA are: bankruptcy; the Personal Insolvency Arrangement 
(PIA); the Debt Settlement Arrangement (DSA); and the Debt Relief Notice (DRN). The 
bankruptcy procedure is complicated, very public, and expensive – involving ‘lengthy High 
Court proceedings’ - creating insurmountable hurdles for a LILA debtor to obtain debt relief. 
317 The PIA and DSA both make provision for schemes of arrangement whereby debtors enter 
into a binding agreement with creditors. The PIA is essentially for rearranging secured debts 
and DSA for unsecured debt. Both involve High Court supervision and are therefore 
complicated and expensive and not suitable for LILA debtors who do not have surplus 
income.318 The debt relief notice (DRN), 319 which is strikingly similar to the debt relief order 
(DRO) in England and Wales, was designed specifically for debtors who have minimal assets 
and who are unable to pay their unsecured debts, ie, for LILA debtors. This debt relief 
measure will now be discussed. 
3.5.2 Debt relief notice (DRN) 
This procedure is basically an administrative one, initiated by a debtor after submission of a 
written statement, which complies with section 27 (1) of the PIA, or by an intermediary320 on 
the debtor’s behalf.321 The application is made to the Insolvency Service.322A debtor is 
required to meet certain eligibility criteria in order to qualify for a DRN, including that the 
debtor: 
a) must have qualifying debts that amount to €20 000 or less; 
b) has net disposable income of €60 or less per month; 
c) has assets worth €400 or less; 
d) is domiciled in the state or within one year before the application date ordinarily 
resided in the state or had a place of business in the state; and  
e) has no likelihood of becoming solvent within the next period of 3 years.323 
                                                          
317Ibid 249.  
318Ibid 251. 
319See Part 3 Chapter 1 of the PIA. 
320In terms of section 25 of the PIA an intermediary is a person or class of person who is given authority by the 
Insolvency Service to execute the duties of an approved intermediary such as making application on behalf of a 
debtor as pointed out above. 
321S 29 (1) of the PIA. 
322S 29 (2) of the PIA. 
323S 26 (2) of the PIA. 
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The procedure allows for exemption of certain assets the value of which should not exceed 
€6000.324 The debtor is ineligible for the DRN in various specified instances including, for 
example, where the debtor is a party to, or has successfully completed within the period of 5 
years before the application date, a DSA or a PIA or where a creditor has petitioned for the 
debtor’s bankruptcy.325 
3.5.3 Moratorium 
During the running of the debt relief notice a moratorium is provided against any legal 
proceeding, judgment debt or any other enforcement procedure.326 However, a creditor may 
bring such a proceeding, execution or other legal processes with leave of the court, where it 
deems this appropriate, and enforcement of criminal proceedings against the debtor is not 
restricted.327 In cases where the debtor’s situation changes positively, he or she is required to 
notify the Insolvency Service during the supervision period. This must occur, for instance, 
where his or her salary increases by €400 or more, or when he or she receives a gift worth 
€500, in which case 50 percent of that gift will be surrendered to the Insolvency Service.328 
3.5.4 Debt discharge 
The debt relief notice will lapse after a period of three years.329 Although, in some cases, the 
supervision period may be extended.330 Debt discharge has the effect of discharging all the 
specified qualifying debts, subject to certain exceptions,331 and also the removal of the 
debtor’s name from the Registrar of Debt Relief Notices.332 Notably, Spooner333 criticises the 
discharge period for being too long for a debtor who has no disposable income as well as no 
assets for liquidation, especially when compared to the one year period applicable in England 
and Wales under the debt relief order (DRO) procedure.   
                                                          
324S 26 (6) (c) (1) of the PIA. These assets are comprised of household equipment, appliances for maintenance 
of a reasonable life by a debtor and his or her dependents, books, tools and other items of equipment used by 
him or her that are reasonably necessary in his or her employment, business or vocation. 
325S 26 (8) of the PIA. 
326S 35 of the PIA. 
327S 35 (3) of the PIA. 
328S 36 (2) of the PIA. 
329S 34 (1) of the PIA. 
330S 34 (2) of the PIA. It will be extended in instances where an investigation needs to be carried out, or for 
court consideration where an application has been lodged against discharge by an affected person or creditor. 
331S 46 of the PIA. The exceptions are: interest; penalties; and other sums which have become due and payable. 
332S 37 (2) of the PIA. 
333Spooner (note 251 above) 761. 
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On 7 October 2014, the Insolvency Service Ireland, in an endeavour to facilitate debtors’ 
‘getting back on track’, announced a waiver of all fees for debtors applying, inter alia, for a 
DRN.334 Thus it is evident that Ireland has incorporated internationally recognised debt relief 
norms into their system. 
3.6 New Zealand 
3.6.1 Background 
The Insolvency Act 2006 (IANZ),335 which came into effect in New Zealand in December 
2007, provides for a bankruptcy process and three alternative debt relief mechanisms, 
namely, proposals for financial restructuring,336 summary instalment orders,337 and the ‘no 
asset procedure’ (NAP).338 In terms of section 101 of the IANZ, the debtor’s property vests in 
the Assignee at adjudication, but with the exclusion of certain property, in terms of section 
158. The bankruptcy procedure is not suitable for a LILA debtor due, inter alia, to its 
duration and consequent restrictions.339 A debtor’s proposal, which must be court-approved, 
and also the summary instalment order, issued by the Assignee,340 is not suitable for LILA 
debtors341on account of surplus income being necessary, for each procedure, for the debtor to 
make payments towards the debt. In the circumstances, similar arguments may be raised, as 
regards LILA debtors, as have been put forward in relation to the unsuitability of these 
procedures for ‘no income no asset’ (NINA) debtors who likewise have very little or no 
income to pay towards their debt, with the result that creditors are more likely to reject the 
proposal.342 The NAP was specifically designed to accommodate a debtor with little surplus, 
or no, income.  
                                                          
334See press release available at 
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Press_Release_07_10_14.pdf/Files/Press_Release_07_10_14.pdf accessed on 6 
December 2014. 
335Public Act 2006 NO 55 (NZ). 
336S 325 - 339. 
337S 340 - 360. 
338S 361 - 377B. 
339M Josling ‘Alternatives to bankruptcy’ in Paul Heath and Michael Whale (eds) Insolvency Law in New 
Zealand Lexis Nexis (2011) 7; Coetzee and Roestoff (note 6 above) 204. See also T Keeper ‘New Zealand’s No 
Asset Procedure: A fresh start at no cost?’ 14 QUT Law Review (2014) 79, 79. 
340S 340. The summary instalment orders require a debtor to pay their debts in instalments (or otherwise) either 
in full or to the extent that the Assignee considers practical based on a particular case. 
341S 331 - 333. 
342D Brown ‘The Financial Health Benefits of a Quick “NAP” New Zealand’s Solution to Consumer 
Insolvency?’ (INSOL Conference Academic Programme, Vancouver, June 2009) 8. 
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It may be noted that New Zealand provides a specific debt relief mechanism for NINA 
debtors in order to provide them with a ‘fresh start’.343  As Josling explains:344 
‘the basic policy behind this procedure is that the full bankruptcy process, with its duration, 
and consequential restrictions, is no longer appropriate to small debtors. These debtors, it is 
said, are typically always struggling to pay their debts, and are usually pushed into 
bankruptcy by some unfortunate event. In bankruptcy a dividend is ever hardly paid to 
creditors. Thus the justifications combine economic, humanitarian, and practical rationales.’ 
Thus the NAP merits discussed since it would accommodate LILA debtors whose income 
typically is able to cover only subsistence expenses. 
3.6.2 The no asset procedure (NAP) 
The NAP has stringent entry requirements designed to prevent fraud.345 Access to the NAP is 
limited to debtors who are not able to discharge payment towards their debt either 
‘immediately or in the short or medium term’.346 The criteria are that the debtor:347 
a) has no realisable assets;348 and 
b) was not previously admitted to the no asset procedure; and 
c) has not previously been adjudicated bankrupt; and 
d) has total debts (not inclusive of any student loan balance) that are not less than $1,000 
and not more than $40,000349 and 
e) after undergoing a means test, is established not to have the means of repaying any 
amount towards his or her debt.350 
                                                          
343Coetzee and Roestoff (note 6 above) 201; Keeper (note 339 above) 80.  
344Josling (note 339 above). 
345Coetzee and Roestoff (note 6 above) 204. See also D Brown and T GW Telfer Personal and Corporate 
Insolvency Legislation: Guide and Commentary to the 2006 Amendments 2 ed LexisNexis NZ Limited (2013) 
38; Keeper (note 339 above) 88.  
346Even though the policy documents surrounding the NAP targeted on consumer debtors, this is not so based on 
the criteria set out in section 363 (1); see ibid. Brown and Telfer note that, instead of drawing a comparison 
between non consumer and consumer debtors, the ‘no asset procedure seeks to take a subset of debtors out of 
the bankruptcy procedure by screening for no asset debtors based on a number of listed criteria’; see D Brown 
and T GW Telfer (note 345 above) 39. 
347S 363 (1) (a) - (e). 
348See s 363 (2) in relation to which assets are included. 
349S 363 (3) provides that these amounts are subject to variation by the Govenor-General by order in Council to 
take account of increases in the all groups index of the Consumer Price Index. 
52 
 
In relation to the means test, Keeper351 observes that ‘persons who are employed are often 
ineligible for NAP, because they are in a position to make on-going contributions towards 
their debt’. Kepper352 further submits that ‘for this reason, NAP debtors predominantly are 
less likely to be employed than debtors under either of the alternative insolvency procedures’.  
Nevertheless, a debtor is allowed to keep some assets, the maximum value of which will be 
determined by the Official Assignee, such as tools necessary for trade, household furniture 
and effects and a motor vehicle with a maximum value of $5,000.353 A debtor who qualifies 
for NAP, as prescribed by section 363 must complete and file with the Assignee an 
application and statement of affairs, both in the prescribed form.354 The application may be 
accepted or rejected if the Assignee regards it as incorrect or incomplete355 and a debtor may 
also be disqualified from the NAP in some instances.356 After the debtor has applied to the 
Assignee, the Assignee must immediately send a summary of the debtor’s assets and 
liabilities to all the creditors of the debtor.357 A debtor who has applied to get debt relief 
under the NAP is restricted from obtaining credit which exceeds $100, even on hire purchase, 
either alone or jointly with another person, except where the debtor first informs the credit 
provider that he or she is under the NAP.358Admission to the NAP takes place when the 
Assignee sends written notice of this to the debtor.359 Furthermore, the Assignee should 
notify creditors and advertise the debtor’s admission to the NAP in the prescribed manner.360 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
350The prescribed means test is provided for in Insolvency (Personal insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 65 and 
66 read with reg 6. In terms of Regulation 66, the means test for the purposes of section 363 (1) (e) is whether, 
taking into account the income of the debtor personally and that of any relative with whom the debtor lives, the 
debtor has a surplus of money after paying the household’s usual and reasonable living expenses. 
351Keeper (note 339 above) 90. 
352Ibid.  
353Insolvency and Trustee Service The No Asset Procedure (NAP) and your assets available at 
http://www.insolvency.govt.nz/cms/financial-trouble/personal/step3/no-asset-procedure/what-happens-to-your-
assets-when-you-enter-a-nap accessed on 11 November 2014. 
354S 362 (1) and s 362 (2) (a)-(b). See also Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 65. 
355S 362 (3). 
356S 364 (a) - (d). These instances are where the debtor conceals assets to deprive his or her creditors for 
example transferring property to a trust. Section 374 (1) provides that the Assignee may apply to the court to 
make an order of preservation of the debtors assets pending the application for the debtor’s adjudication where 
the debtor misled the Assignee or conceal assets. Furthermore, disqualification instances are such as where the 
debtor engages in conduct that is an offence under bankruptcy, debtor incurs a debt or debts where he or she has 
no means or repaying them back, where an application is lodged by a creditor for the debtor’s adjudication as 
bankrupt and a materially better outcome will be more likely for creditors than where the debtor is admitted to 
the no asset procedure. 
357S 365. 
358S 366. 
359S 367 (1). See also Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 67. 
360S 367 (2). See also Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 67. 
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A public register of debtors admitted to the NAP, and discharged from the NAP, will be kept 
by the Assignee.361 
3.6.3 Moratorium and effect of the NAP 
Entrance to the NAP by the debtor has the effect of prohibiting creditors from beginning or 
continuing any step to recover or enforce a debt which the debtor owes, or which may be 
provable if the debtor were to be adjudicated bankrupt.362 However, there are certain debts 
that remain enforceable, such as those under a maintenance order in terms of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, child support amounts in terms of the Child Support Act 1991, and 
student loan balances.363 Notably, Coetzee and Roestoff364 point out a discrepancy regarding 
treatment of student loan balances between the NAP and the bankruptcy procedure: under 
bankruptcy they are dischargeable. A debtor has various duties under the NAP365 and failure 
to abide by them may constitute an offences, as outlined in section 371 (1),366 which may 
attract punishment by a fine or imprisonment.367  
3.6.4 Debt discharge 
Debt discharge takes place automatically after twelve months from the start date of admission 
to the NAP.368 The discharge has the effect of cancelling all the debts subject to the NAP, as 
though they never existed. The debtor will not be liable to pay any interest or penalties that 
accrued during the period of the NAP.369 Certain debts are non-dischargeable, such as debts 
resulting from fraud or fraudulent breach of trust.370 The debtor is also liable to pay any 
                                                          
361S 368 (1). 
362S 369 (1) (a) - (b). 
363S 369 (2). 
364Coetzee and Roestoff (note 6 above) 205. 
365S 370 (1) - (3). These duties are such as complying with a reasonable request from the Assignee, to provide 
assistance, documents, and necessary information to the Assignee. In instances where the debtor’s 
circumstances change and he or she is able to repay an amount towards his or her debts referred to in s 369(1), 
he or she should notify the Assignee.  
366These offences are, for example, where the debtor alone or jointly with another person obtains for the time 
being credit worth $1,000 or more; incurs liability for the time being to any person of $1,000 or more on behalf 
of another person; enters into a hire purchase agreement under which the debtor will be liable to pay $1,000 or 
more. However, s 371 (2) (a) - (b) outlines defences, such as: where the debtor informs the creditor first before 
obtaining credit worth $1,000 or more that the debtor is under the NAP; and where before incurring credit worth 
$1,000 or more on behalf of another person the debtor informed the person giving the credit that he or she is 
under the NAP. 
367S 371 (3). 
368S 377 (1). However, in terms of  s 377 (2) (a), discharge may be delayed in instances where termination is 
under consideration by the Assignee and where a deferral notice is send to the debtor upon which the debtor will 
be discharged on the date specified in the deferral notice in terms of s 377 (6). 
369S 377A (1). 
370S 377A (2) (a) - (b). 
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penalties or interest in relation to the non-dischargeable debts.371 It may be noted that 
Keeper372 criticises the NAP on account of there being no debt education prerequisite for 
discharge. There are strong arguments to suggest that debt education may have the effect of 
ensuring that the debtor becomes a responsible and cautious borrower in the future.  
3.7 Comparative remarks  
Drawing comparisons between the South African debt relief measures and foreign 
jurisdictions’ debt relief mechanisms suitable for LILA debtors may be useful for establishing 
whether there is need to introduce a specific debt relief mechanism for LILA debtors in South 
Africa. 
In the USA, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for a repayment plan, is 
similar to debt review and debt re-arrangement, under the NCA, and the administration order, 
under the MCA. However, both the NCA and the MCA place restrictions on the type of debts 
and/or the amount of debt covered. The effect is to bar certain debtors, who do not fall in 
either of the categories, from obtaining debt relief. Debt review and debt re-arrangement and 
the administration order therefore in a measure provide relief to a LILA debtor who has either 
credit agreement debt or whose debt does not exceed the MCA’s R50 000 monetary cap. 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords debt discharge to a debtor -a feature which is not 
found under either debt review and debt re-arrangement or the administration order. Be that 
as it may, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide debt relief to a LILA debtor, 
and nor do debt review and debt re-arrangement or the administration order, because, 
typically, a LILA debtor does not have surplus income to contribute to a repayment plan. 
In the USA, a LILA debtor is provided debt relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which is administrative in nature and for which the debtor has to meet a ‘means test’ in order 
to qualify. This minimises a debtor’s costs towards getting debt relief and prevents abuse of 
the procedure. Chapter 7 of Bankruptcy Code is similar to sequestration in South Africa in 
that the debtor’s assets are liquidated and the debtor ultimately obtains debt discharge. A 
debtor gets a ‘fresh start’, thus meeting the international norm. However, for a debtor to get 
debt relief under the sequestration procedure in South Africa he or she has to meet the 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement, which a LILA debtor will never be able meet. 
                                                          
371S 377A (3). 
372Keeper (note 339 above) 91. 
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In England and Wales, the bankruptcy procedure is comparable to the sequestration 
procedure in South Africa, although England and Wales do not have the strict requirement of 
‘advantage to creditors’.  There are also various options in terms of repayment plans, but, as 
discussed above, these are unsuitable for LILA debtors. Recognising this, the legislature 
introduced into the Insolvency Act 1986  a specific debt relief mechanism, the debt relief 
order (DRO), which is an extra-judicial procedure, ie, administrative in nature, and which 
imposes monetary thresholds to guard against abuse of the procedure, and provides debt 
relief, including a moratorium against actions by creditors, and debt discharge for qualifying 
debtors. 
The sequestration procedure in Scotland is almost similar to the one in South Africa in the 
sense that a debtor surrenders his or her assets for liquidation, the proceeds of which are 
distributed to creditors. The entry requirements are not as strict as in South Africa as 
‘advantage to creditors’ does not have to be established. The PTD and DAS in Scotland make 
provision for repayment plans but, as found in other jurisdictions already discussed, they do 
not specifically provide debt relief to a LILA debtor.  
Therefore, Scotland enacted specific provisions, inserted into the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 
1985, for a ‘Low Income, Low Asset’ route into bankruptcy, which is an extra-judicial 
procedure and which provides the debtor with a moratorium against debt enforcement by 
creditors as well as debt discharge. The Scottish legislature has taken further steps to enact 
new provisions for a new, ‘minimal asset’ procedure, which will replace the current LILA 
provisions in April 2015. 
In Ireland, the bankruptcy procedure shares some similarities with the sequestration 
procedure in South Africa. The bankruptcy procedure involves High Court costs, a feature 
which is also found in the sequestration procedure in South Africa, which makes it 
impossible for a LILA debtor to get debt relief. The DSA and PIA are unsuitable for LILA 
debtors who typically do not have surplus income to apply in repayment plans. The debt 
relief notice (DRN) specifically provides for relief for LILA debtors and applies international 
policies and norms relating to debt discharge for a LILA debtor. The procedure is 
administrative in nature and thus enables a LILA debtor to access the mechanism in order to 
get debt relief. This position in Ireland is unlike that in South Africa where there is no 
specific mechanism for LILA debtors. 
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In New Zealand, the bankruptcy procedure shares some similarities with the South African 
sequestration order in that the debtor’s assets are surrendered for the benefit of creditors. In 
New Zealand, the bankruptcy procedure has a monetary cap for debts that are applicable, 
unlike in South Africa where a debtor has to meet the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement.  
Proposals and summary instalment orders require a debtor to have surplus income in order to 
make repayments. This position is similar to that in terms of debt review and re-arrangement 
and the administration order, in South Africa, whereby a debtor makes some repayments 
towards a debt repayment plan. For similar reasons, expressed above, these are unsuitable for 
LILA debtors.  
In New Zealand, the NAP process caters for LILA debtors, with a ‘means test’ that guards 
against abuse of the procedure, a moratorium against debt enforcement and debt discharge. It 
is conceivable that the ‘means test’ may have a negative impact on the accessibility of a 
LILA debtor to the NAP, as it was devised specifically for debtors with no income and no 
assets. However, it is unclear whether there is a need to address the debt issues of LILA 
debtors who may not be covered under the NAP process. 
3.8 Conclusion 
It is important to note that the systems adopted in the foreign jurisdictions considered in this 
Chapter accommodate a LILA debtor. The debtor has to show some level of honesty when 
seeking debt relief. Spooner373 submits that ‘English law provides easy access to bankruptcy 
and a smooth procedural pathway to discharge’. None of the systems discussed require 
‘advantage to creditors’. Further, they do not contain overly strict entry requirements which 
would preclude an over-indebted LILA debtor from accessing debt relief. These foreign 
jurisdictions have adopted measures which are strikingly similar in a number of respects. For 
instance, a debtor has to satisfy certain criteria which guard against abuse of the system, and 
each provides a moratorium, prohibiting enforcement or debt recovery measures, and, lastly, 
a relatively easy and expeditious debt discharge, which enables a debtor to have a ‘fresh 
start’. Thus the above discussed foreign jurisdictions have achieved with regards to debt 
discharge what is stated in the World Bank Report that ‘the most effective form of relief from 
debt is a fresh start…’.374 
                                                          
373Spooner (note 203 above) 250. 
374World Bank Report (note 6 above) par 360. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
‘In a modern credit-driven society, debt relief is of outmost importance and it is thus apparent 
that the South African insolvency regime is in urgent need of reform. Equal relief should be 
provided to all insolvent and debt stressed individuals and the opportunity to obtain a 
statutory discharge should thus be afforded to all debtors, not only those who are able to 
prove an advantage to creditors. A proper alternative debt relief measure providing for a 
discharge of debt is thus of paramount importance.’375    
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter, material presented in Chapters Two and Three, on debt relief mechanisms in 
South Africa and the treatment of ‘low income low income’ (LILA) debtors in the selected 
foreign jurisdictions, will be summarised.  Comparisons have been drawn between the 
position of LILA debtors in South Africa and in other jurisdictions in which specific 
mechanisms have been devised in order to provide LILA debtors with debt relief. This 
chapter will contain recommendations for the enactment of an appropriate debt relief 
mechanism for LILA debtors in South Africa. 
4.2 Debt relief mechanisms in South Africa 
In Chapter Two, the common law compromise and statutory mechanisms available to 
financially stressed debtors were set out, including, in terms of the Insolvency Act, the two 
sequestration procedures, namely, voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration, the 
administration order, under the MCA, and also debt review and debt re-arrangement, under 
the NCA. It was shown that none of these is suitable for a LILA debtor. 
Sequestration of a debtor’s estate entails liquidation of a debtor’s estate, the distribution of 
the proceeds amongst creditors and, ultimately, the debtor’s discharge from liability for pre-
sequestration debt as a consequence of rehabilitation. However, in order for a debtor to obtain 
debt relief under the sequestration procedure, the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement must 
be met.376 This applies in both voluntary surrender, in which the debtor, and in compulsory 
sequestration (including friendly sequestration), where the applicant creditor, must prove that 
sequestration of a debtor’s estate will result in a pecuniary benefit to creditors. In the case of 
a LILA debtor with few assets and little income, it will be impossible for ‘advantage to 
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creditors’ to be established. In addition, the sequestration procedure is initiated by way of a 
High Court application. Thus, the procedure involves court costs and legal fees for 
representation. These features combined make the procedure expensive for a debtor with little 
income and insufficient assets with the effect that a LILA debtor will not be able to get debt 
relief via sequestration.377 
The administration order may provide debt relief, to some extent, to a LILA debtor whose 
total debt falls below the monetary cap of R50 000. However, it should be noted that many 
LILA debtors may have incurred debt in excess of this amount. These LILA debtors will be 
excluded from getting debt relief through an administration order. Furthermore, application 
for an administration order must be made to the magistrate’s court,378 thus making the 
procedure expensive for a qualifying debtor to apply for debt relief. Further, because an 
administration order does not include in futuro debts,379 a qualifying debtor has to discharge 
payment towards such debts in addition to the payments required in terms of an 
administration order that is issued. This has the effect of payment defaults by the debtor. 
Significantly, there is no limit to the duration of an administration order and the procedure 
does not have a debt discharge provision. Therefore, the effect is to keep the debtor under 
‘debt servitude’ for a long time, which in some cases may extend to the debtor’s life time. In 
addition, there is on-going abuse of the administration order.380 The lacunae under the 
administration procedure, which have been exposed, as a whole have the effect of not 
providing appropriate debt relief to a LILA debtor. 
Chapter Two also established that debt review and debt re-arrangement under the NCA does 
not provide adequate debt relief to LILA debtors. This was shown through the fact that the 
procedure covers ‘credit agreements’381 only. Therefore, although, at face value it can be said 
to provide relief to LILA debtors,  closer scrutiny reveals that the procedure will not assist a 
LILA debtor in instances where the debts arise out of ‘credit agreements’. This also means 
that a LILA debtor whose debts are a combination of ‘credit agreement’, and other types of, 
debt, may only be partially provided with debt relief under the NCA. What is more, as in the 
case of administration orders, there is no limit to the duration of the debt re-arrangement plan 
                                                          







and the procedure does not provide a debtor with debt discharge.382 This, therefore, has the 
effect of making the debtor remain subject to the debt re-arrangement procedure for a long 
period of time that could extend to decades.  
It is clear, from the requirements and procedures, that the South African debt relief legislative 
mechanisms target a particular type of debtor. The situation is that either a debtor qualifies 
for debt relief in respect of the sequestration procedure, administration order and the debt 
review and debt re-arrangement procedure, or he or she does not. It is an ‘all or nothing’ 
situation in which lacunae in the South African debt relief mechanisms have the effect of 
excluding LILA debtors from obtaining debt relief. These debtors are left at the mercy of 
creditors. The position in South Africa may be compared to that in the selected foreign 
jurisdictions where a LILA debtor has a specific debt relief mechanism at his or her disposal, 
which is followed by debt discharge.  
4.3. Debt relief mechanisms for LILA debtors in foreign jurisdictions 
In Chapter Three it was established that, in the USA, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code has 
the effect of providing adequate debt relief to a LILA debtor. In order to curb abuse of the 
procedure the debtor has to undergo a prescribed ‘means test’, which was introduced by the 
BAPCPA, which makes a determination of eligibility based on the debtor’s income level. The 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure is inexpensive,383 making it easier for a LILA debtor to file 
for debt relief. Debt counselling is also a pre-requisite before a debtor files for a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding.384 Upon acceptance to the procedure, a moratorium, referred to as an 
‘automatic stay’, comes into effect which has the effect of protecting a debtor from 
enforcement by creditors.385 Finally, a debtor gets an automatic debt discharge after the 
completion of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure,386 which enables him or her to have a 
‘fresh start’. In cases of few assets the discharge takes place almost immediately and there is 
not always a liquidation sale, therefore the proceedings are completed within a short period of 
time.387   
In England and Wales, the debt relief order (DRO) is especially included in the Insolvency 
Act 1986 as a mechanism to provide adequate debt relief to a LILA debtor. The eligibility 
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387Ibid. See also 3.2.2.  
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criterion to be met by a debtor is based on certain monetary value thresholds, which are that: 
the debtor’s debt should not exceed £15,000; assets must be worth not more than £300; and 
the debtor’s income should not exceed £50.388 The procedure is administrative in nature, 
which involves an application for the debt relief order through an intermediary.389 It is 
submitted that with an intermediary involved, the procedure is less expensive and more 
accessible to a LILA debtor because legal representation is not required. As soon as the 
debtor enters the DRO, a moratorium comes into place that bars actions against the debtor in 
relation to debts covered by the order.390 Finally, a debtor gets a ‘fresh start’ through debt 
discharge, which takes place at the end of the one-year moratorium period.391 Thus, the 
procedure provides appropriate debt relief to a LILA debtor in England and Wales. 
The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 provides for a specific ‘Low Income, Low Asset’ 
procedure, often referred to as the ‘LILA route into bankruptcy’. A debtor who is not able to 
pay his or her debts as they fall due, and whose level of income and asset values qualifies him 
for access to this form of debt relief, 392 may make an application, which will be determined 
by the Accountant in Bankruptcy or the Sheriff.393 The debtor gets a ‘fresh start’ through 
discharge which takes place after one year.394 A new ‘minimal asset procedure’ recently 
received Royal Assent and will replace the LILA route into bankruptcy in April 2015. In 
terms of the new procedure, a debtor will have to undergo debt counselling first.395 It also has 
set out debt396 and asset value levels397 for a debtor to qualify. Finally, the debtor will get 
debt discharge, and thus a ‘fresh start’ after a period of six months.398  
In Ireland, the Personal Insolvency Act 2012, includes in its provisions the debt relief notice 
(DRN) in order to provide debt relief to a LILA debtor. The Act sets out debt, income and 
asset value thresholds, for a debtor to qualify for relief.399 Further, the procedure is 
administrative in nature - application is done through an intermediary of the Insolvency 
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Service.400 This enables a LILA debtor to apply for relief since the procedure is inexpensive. 
Notably, all application fees have been waived, in Ireland, in order to assist debtors further.401 
A moratorium, which prohibits any action or proceeding, comes into place as soon the debtor 
is under the procedure.402 Finally, a debtor gets debt discharge after a period of three years.403 
This has the effect of enabling a debtor to have a ‘fresh start’. Criticism has been levelled at 
the length of this period, with a suggestion that it should be reduced to one year, as in 
England and Wales.404 
Finally, Chapter Three considered how LILA debtors are treated in New Zealand. The ‘No 
Assets Procedure’ (NAP) specifically provides debt relief to NINA debtors and, it is 
submitted, would apparently also be available to LILA debtors who have minimal surplus 
income to pay for anything besides basic necessities. If not, there may be a need to address 
the debt problem of LILA debtors in New Zealand, although this has apparently not been an 
issue. The NAP requires a debtor to undergo a ‘means test’, in order to qualify,405 and 
application is made to the Official Assignee,406 which therefore makes this (administrative) 
procedure inexpensive for a debtor since there are no court costs involved. A moratorium is 
provided for, which has the effect of staying any action or proceeding against the debtor.407 
Finally, a debtor gets a debt discharge after one year,408 enabling a debtor to have a ‘fresh 
start’ - a common feature found in all the jurisdictions that were discussed in Chapter Three. 
4.4 Comparative Remarks 
 
It is important to note that a LILA debtor is offered a measure of debt relief in all the foreign 
jurisdictions that were discussed in Chapter Three. Therefore, the position of these debtors in 
foreign jurisdictions is unlike the position in South Africa where there is no appropriate debt 
relief mechanism for LILA debtors. 
In the foreign jurisdictions that were discussed in Chapter Three, a LILA debtor has to meet 
the ‘means test’ or monetary, asset value thresholds and in some jurisdictions income value 
levels in order to get debt relief. This is unlike in South Africa where a debtor’s debt must not 
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exceed R50 000 or a debtor must have debt arising out of credit agreements in order to get 
debt relief. Failure to meet these requirements means that a LILA debtor in South Africa has 
no any other debt relief mechanism at his or her disposal since sequestration is an 
insurmountable hurdle to a LILA debtor. These debtors are therefore left at the mercy of 
creditors. This therefore calls for this area of law to be reformed.  
South Africa lacks an appropriate administrative debt relief procedure for LILA debtors as 
compared to the position of LILA debtors in some foreign jurisdictions. The discussed 
foreign jurisdictions provide debt relief mechanisms to a LILA debtor that are administrative 
in nature. An intermediary is involved in some jurisdictions. This therefore makes the 
procedure less expensive. This position is unlike in South Africa where the LILA debtor has 
to meet the High Court costs and legal representation in order to get debt relief under the 
sequestration procedure in terms of the Insolvency Act or magistrate’s court costs for an 
administration order in terms of the MCA, or for debt review and debt re-arrangement under 
the NCA. 
Debt discharge of a LILA debtor leading to a ‘fresh start’ is a feature of all of the debt relief 
mechanisms in the foreign jurisdictions that were discussed in Chapter Three. It is an 
international norm that is not found in debt review and debt re-arrangement under the NCA 
or in the administration procedure under the MCA. The debt discharge of LILA debtors in the 
discussed foreign jurisdictions takes place within a short period of time except in Ireland 
where it takes place after three years. The three year period for discharge is facing criticism 
as discussed above. Thus these foreign jurisdictions with regard to debt discharge are in line 
with the INSOL International Consumer Debt Report which states:409 
 ‘In whatever form a discharge ultimately takes, debtors should have an opportunity to obtain 
relief from pre-existing indebtedness and to have a fresh start, free from their past financial 
obligations.’ 
4.5 Recommendations 
Having advanced arguments which show the lack of appropriate debt relief mechanisms for 
LILA debtors in South Africa, study of the treatment of LILA debtors in foreign jurisdictions 
provides useful insights and guidance on ways to address the current position in this country. 
The following recommendations serve to provide for the way forward. The recommendations 
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call for a hybrid debt relief mechanism with features adopted from the foreign jurisdictions 
that were selected and discussed. The main mandate, or objective, should be to provide debt 
relief to a LILA debtor rather than a debt collection method for creditors; this may be 
supported by the submission advanced by Ramsay and Spooner410 that ‘modern personal 
insolvency law is primarily about debtor relief rather than distribution of assets or 
investigation of an individual’s affairs’. 
This dissertation calls for an out of court debt relief mechanism. It should be administrative in 
nature and therefore appropriate for LILA debtors, who have little income and few assets and 
are not a position to pay for High Court costs as well as legal representation. The Consumer 
Debt Report states that: 411  
‘extra-judicial or out-of-court proceeding take less of the courts’ time and of the judiciary, are less 
expensive and can be better designed for a more integrated approach to the problems the debtor is 
facing, which are more of a non-legal than of a legal nature.’ 
The World Bank Report further states that court costs are an accessibility obstacle to a low 
income and insufficient debtor to get debt relief.412 The measure should therefore comprise an 
out of court process of debt settlement or re-arrangement facilitated by a statutorily bound 
intermediary, as seen in foreign jurisdictions. The procedure will therefore be inexpensive to 
a LILA debtor. Boraine and Roestoff413 call for a less expensive informal debt relief measure 
for NINA debtors which will do away with the discrimination against these debtors at 
presently in South Africa.  
The fact that the intermediary would be statutorily bound and regulated would have the effect 
of minimising abuse of office. Thus intermediaries should be qualified to do the job.414 For 
instance, in cases where the intermediary is not bound, he or she might convert any 
surrendered income and assets for other purposes, as shown by the abuse taking place under 
the administration order in South Africa.415 The intermediary’s costs should also be paid out 
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of the surrendered income and assets in cases where the LILA debtor is in no position to pay 
for extra costs. This will enable that particular LILA debtor to apply for debt relief. 
Measures guarding against abuse of the mechanism should be introduced in order to curb 
debtors, who have enough disposable income and sufficient assets, from accessing the 
process. The study calls for a ‘means test’ such as the one in USA under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The determination should be done based on whether a debtor’s income 
exceeds the poverty datum line. The ‘means test’ should be clear and must have the effect of 
accommodating every LILA debtor in South Africa but ensure that debtors with surplus 
income will not be able to abuse the proposed mechanism. Before a debtor gets debt relief it 
is proposed that a debtor should get debt counselling so that they will be responsible 
borrowers in the future. 
During the tenure of the proposed mechanism it is proposed that a debtor should be provided 
with a moratorium against debt enforcement actions. Further, this will be in line with the 
Consumer Debt Report that a moratorium should be provided during the running tenure of the 
insolvency process.416 This will ensure the smooth running of the mechanism.  
Finally, upon the lapse of the debt relief mechanism it is proposed that a debtor should be 
afforded a debt discharge. This serves two purposes: to permit a LILA debtor to become an 
active member of the economy; and to boost the economy through having active members. 
As Spooner417  puts it, the ‘fresh start’, a common phenomenon in modern insolvency law,  
‘aims to free debtors from the burden of lifelong indebtedness in order to achieve increased 
economic productivity and entrepreneurship, as well as to serve social justice aims and 
humanitarian goals.’ 
 The debtor will therefore get a ‘fresh start’, a common feature which is achieved in all of the 
foreign jurisdictions that were discussed in this dissertation. Thus, South Africa will be on a 
par with other countries in this regard.  In respect of poor debtors, discharge should take place 
immediately as is seen in the USA.418  
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The South African debt relief mechanisms lack an appropriate out of court procedure that is 
accessible to a LILA debtor. The various entry requirements for each available mechanism 
determine who may and who may not get debt relief. These all exclude LILA debtors and, 
ironically - and tragically - these are debtors who need debt relief the most. This has the 
effect of leaving the LILA debtors to the wrath of creditors. Although the sequestration 
procedure does at least provide debt discharge, upon rehabilitation in terms of the Insolvency 
Act 1936, and therefore a ‘fresh start’, a LILA debtor will never be able to meet the 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement or meet High Court costs. Administration orders, under 
the MCA, and debt review and debt re-arrangement, under the NCA, endure until the debtor 
has paid all debts in full and there is no statutory limit imposed on the time period for 
payment of debts by the debtor. This will result in the debtor paying their debts for a long 
time, which may extend to their entire lifetime. 
This ‘all or nothing’ situation must end and a solution for LILA debtors should be found. It is 
proposed that a mechanism should be devised – a hybrid of the various features found in 
specific LILA debt relief provisions internationally. It should be an out of court procedure, 
with application being made to a statutorily regulated intermediary. The process should be of 
limited duration, with a moratorium imposed against actions by creditors and debt discharge, 
in order to provide a LILA debtor with a ‘fresh start’. This would afford a LILA debtor with 
an appropriate debt relief option and accord to a LILA debtor the same treatment as other 
debtors in South Africa. Thus the South African insolvency system will be in line with 
proposals made in the INSOL International Consumer Debt Report that ‘legislators should 
enact laws to provide for a fair and equitable, efficient and cost effective, accessible and 
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